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NOTES
LOCKE V. DAVEY AND THE DEATH OF
NEUTRALITY AS A CONCEPT GUIDING
RELIGION CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE
SHANNON BLACK*
"And he said, Woe unto you also, ye lawyers! for ye lade men
with burdens grievous to be borne, and ye yourselves touch
not the burdens with one of your fingers."'
"For this is a heinous crime; yea it is an iniquity to be
punished by the judges."2
* J.D. Candidate, St. John's University School of Law, June 2005; B.F.A. Cinema
Studies/Politics, with departmental honors, New York University, 2003. The author
wishes to thank Professor Robert Vischer for his patience and guidance regarding this
Note, and her parents, George & Cheryl Black, for their unwavering support, even
through difficult times."
1 Luke 11:46.
2 Job 31:11.
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I. INTRODUCTION
On February 25, 2004, in Locke v. Davey,3 the Supreme Court
decided that the Free Exercise Clause- of the First Amendment
did not prevent the State of Washington from denying the
Promise Scholarship, a program generally available to all
students who have met certain threshold requirements, to
students who chose to major in devotional theology. 4 This note
criticizes the Court's holding based on previous Free Exercise
jurisprudence, and also explores the potential implications of this
Court's decision for other areas of government funding. Part II of
this note will describe the Supreme Court's previous decisions
based on the Constitution's two Religion Clauses, focusing
alternatively on the Establishment Clause, the Free Exercise
Clause, and the interaction between the two. Part III will trace
the history of the Locke case, describing its basic facts as well as
its procedural history, and will wrap up with the rationales of
both the majority and dissenting opinions. Part IV will provide
analysis of various facets of the case: Part A will argue that the
Court's rationale was incorrect and that, based on prior
precedent, the Court should have applied strict scrutiny; Part B
will argue that the Religion Clauses should be read together to
require neutrality, which would be an effective way to protect
religious liberty; Part C will prescribe limits to the applicability
of these standards, somewhat implicit in the standards
themselves, basically limiting them to educational funding
situations; Part D will consider the potential implications of the
Court's decision for another large area of educational funding,
school vouchers, and ultimately conclude that the Court's
decision has effectively precluded arguments that state voucher
programs must include religious schools in order to comport with
the federal Constitution's Free Exercise Clause.
3 540 U.S. 712 (2004).
4 Id. at 1315 (explaining that state's interest in not funding pursuit of devotional
degrees is substantial and therefore cannot be deemed unconstitutional); see Gary S. v.
Manchester Sch. Dist., 374 F.3d 15, 22 (1st Cir. 2004) (stating refusal to fund religious
schools does not interfere with freedom of religion); Gary J. Simson, The Establishment
Clause in the Supreme Court: Rethinking the Court's Approach, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 905,
912 (1987) (discussing relationship between government and establishment of religion).
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II. RELIGION CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE PRIOR TO LOCKE V. DAVEY
A. The Establishment Clause
Even though this note will primarily be concerned with the
function of the Free Exercise Clause, a brief explanation of the
current state of the Establishment Clause is important to
understand the implications of an extension of religious liberty in
the Locke situation and also to understand how the two Religion
Clauses work together. The Constitution provides that
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion."5 This clause has been incorporated to the states
through the Fourteenth Amendment. 6 Some previous Supreme
Court language has interpreted the Establishment Clause as
setting up a high wall separating church and state; 7 however, in
its application of this standard, the Supreme Court has not
always struck down the challenged program.8 In 1971, in Lemon
5 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
6 See Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 8 (1947) (applying religion clauses to states;
also, there is language in previous Supreme Court cases suggesting that both clauses
should be incorporated, but this was the first case where the Establishment Clause was
actually at issue); Murdock v. Pennsylvania., 319 U.S. 105, 108 (1943) (applying entire
First Amendment to states); Cantwell v. Connecticut., 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940)
(suggesting both clauses are applicable to states); Douglas Laycock, A Survey of Religious
Liberty in the United States, 47 OHIO ST. L. J. 409, 415-16 (1986) (arguing there has been
controversy among scholars over whether Establishment Clause should be incorporated to
states, and that Civil War history supports view that states can also threaten liberty,
including religious liberty, and that without said Establishment Clause, religious liberty
of state citizens would be less secure). But see William K. Lietzau, Rediscovering the
Establishment Clause: Federalism and the Rollback of Incorporation, 39 DEPAUL L. REV.
1191, 1193 (1990) (arguing Fourteenth Amendment was never intended to incorporate
Establishment Clause to states).
7 See Everson, 330 U.S. at 15-16, 18 (holding that "wall between church and
state.. .must be kept high and impregnable," and also noting establishment of religion
clause means at very least,
[n]either a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church. Neither can pass
laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another. ...
No tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to support any religious activities
or institutions.
Everson, 330 U.S. at 18; see Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 211
(1948) (agreeing with Everson's erection of 'wall of separation between Church and State
and its First Amendment interpretation, but disagreeing over application to case facts);
Bodewes v. Zuoweste, 15 Ill. App. 3d 101, 103 (Ill. App. Ct. 1973) (discussing "wall of
separation" theory).
8 See Everson, 330 U.S. at 17-18. In Everson, the Court upheld, where, despite
articulating separationist approach, state program that provided reimbursement for
money spent for children riding to school using public transportation, even though some
reimbursements went to parents who sent their children to religious schools, because it
was "part of a general program under which [the state] pays the fares of pupils attending
public and other schools." Furthermore, the Court also found it significant that this state
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v. Kurtzman,9 the Court signaled a move away from strict
separation and articulated a three part test to deal with
Establishment Clause cases. This test provides that a statute
must first have a valid secular purpose, then must neither have
the primary purpose or effect of advancing or inhibiting religion,
and also must not lead to an excessive government entanglement
with religion.' 0 This Lemon test was largely a synthesis of
various tests the Court had previously articulated in various
establishment contexts.11 Even though Lemon has not been
explicitly overruled, the Supreme Court has moved away from
this test in many cases. 12
Over the course of its Establishment Clause jurisprudence, the
Court has gradually articulated a more accommodationist
approach than Everson suggests.13 This can be seen even in cases
where the Supreme Court has clung to precedent and applied the
contributed no money to religious schools themselves. In Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S.
203, 220 (1963) the Court stated that although Establishment Clause reflects ideology
that there should be separation between church and state, it does not mean that
separation should exist in all aspects. See also Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 615
(1971), in which the Court explained certain instances where government can be involved
with religion. The Court further stated that, to determine whether or not this
involvement is excessive, look to character and purposes of said benefited institution,
nature of aid, and resulting relationship between this religious authority and
government.
9 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
10 See id. at 612-13 (discussing three part test); see also Comm. for Pub. Educ. &
Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646, 653 (1980) (following three part test delineated
in Lemon); Roemer v. Bd. of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 748 (1976) (explaining three part
test).
11 See Walz v. Tax Comm'n of N.Y., 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970) (adding last prong, in
holding that Supreme Court must be "sure that the end result... is not an excessive
government entanglement with religion"); Bd. of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 243 (1968)
(discussing test's second prong); Schempp, 374 U.S. at 222 (deriving first two prongs of
test by holding "that to withstand the strictures of the Establishment Clause there must
be a secular legislative purpose and a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits
religion").
12 See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 592-93 (1992) (applying 'coercion' test, which
tests whether government action directs formal religious exercise as to encourage or
influence participation of those who object religiously to said exercise); County of
Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 597 (1989) (adopting "endorsement" test, which looks
into context to see if any reasonable observer would deem government to be endorsing
religion); Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 252 (1982) (holding when government shows
denominational preference, law must not only have secular purpose but also survive strict
scrutiny).
13 See Bd. of Educ. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 705 (1994) (explaining that Constitution
allows states to accommodate religious needs by alleviating special burdens); Walz, 397
U.S. at 669-70 (postulating that such course of constitutional neutrality cannot be
straight line); see also David Felsen, Comment, Developments in Approaches to
Establishment Clause Analysis: Consistency for the Future, 38 AM. U.L. REV. 395, 405-06
(1989) (noting development of accommodation to deal with problems associated with strict
separation).
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Lemon test, largely because the Court has often applied this
three part test with a certain amount of flexibility.14 In
particular, this trend, as well as the important implications of
the Court's Establishment Clause precedent for Free Exercise
cases, is highlighted by two cases: Witters v. Washington
Department of Services for the Blind15 and Zelman v. Simmons-
Harris.16 In Witters, applying the Lemon test, the Court reversed
a Washington Supreme Court holding that the Establishment
Clause prohibits state funding, under a general assistance
program, to those who would choose to go to a Christian college
to become a pastor.17 In doing so, the Court applied the Lemon
test.18 Of particular import to the Court was the fact that the aid
was administered directly to the student and any aid directed
toward religious instruction was "only as a result of the
genuinely independent and private choice of aid recipients."19
14 See Theologos Verginis, ACLU v. Capitol Square Review and Advisory Boar& Is
There Salvation for the Establishment Clause? 'With God All Things Are Possible," 34
AKRON L. REV. 741, 745 (2001) (articulating such endorsement test as more flexible
approach to spirit of Lemon test); Ashley M. Bell, Comment, "God Save this Honorable
Court": How Current Establishment Clause Jurisprudence Can Be Reconciled with the
Secularization of Historical Religious Expressions, 50 AM. U.L. REV. 1273, 1290 (2001)
(explaining that Supreme Court is not completely satisfied with this Lemon test and has
been willing to apply different tests); Shahin Rezai, Note, County of Allegheny v. ACLU:
Evolution of Chaos in Establishment Clause Analysis, 40 AM. U. L. REV. 503, 505 (1990)
(describing manipulation of Lemon test by more flexible approaches).
15 474 U.S. 481 (1986) (Witters I).
16 536 U.S. 639 (2002).
17 See Witters II, 474 U.S. at 482 (describing assistance program at issue); See also
Ralph D. Mawdsley, The Equal Access Act and Public Schools: What are the Legal Issues
Related to Recognizing Gay Student Groups? 2001 BYU EDUC. & L. J. 1, 33 n.109 (2001)
(noting how state funding to blind student enrolled at religious college did not violate
Establishment Clause); Michael R. Tucci, Note, Putting the Cart Before the Horse:
Agostini v. Felton Blurs the Line Between Res Judicata and Equitable Relief, 49 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 407, 433 n.l18 (1999) (explaining Witters holding that state funding
education at sectarian universities was constitutional).
18 See Witters II, 474 U.S. at 485-89 n.5 (applying three-part Lemon test to the facts
of case and finding first prong satisfied, as all parties conceded that the program's
purpose was secular, and that the second prong, while more difficult, was also satisfied
because aid went directly to the student and it was not clear that a significant portion of
the aid would be expended for religious education; however, Court declined to reach the
third prong, thereby because it remanded case for further findings as to state
constitution). See generally Jesse H. Choper, A Century of Religious Freedom, 88 CALIF. L.
REV. 1709, 1729 (2000) (explaining that Lemon test's application in Witters led to Court's
determination that "the provision of financial assistance by the state to enable someone to
become a pastor, missionary, or church youth director clearly has the primary effect of
advancing religion"); Michael C. Petko & Craig R. Wood, Assessing Agostino v. Felton in
Light of Lemon v. Kurtzman: The Coming of Age in the Debate Between Religious
Affiliated Schools and State Aid, 2000 BYU EDUC. & L. J. 1, 5 (2000) (stating that Witters
Court based its decision on Lemon's second prong).
19 Witters II, 474 U.S. at 487 (noting student uses funding for institution of her
choice).
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In Zelman, the Supreme Court's most recent statement on the
Establishment Clause, the Court continued in this trend by
upholding a school voucher program that allowed parents to use
state aid for their children to attend religious as well as secular
private schools.20 The Court resorted to a modified Lemon test
analysis: whether the law had the purpose or effect of advancing
or inhibiting religion.21 The Court noted that the significant
distinction to be drawn was between cases where the government
aids religion directly and cases where the aid reaches religious
schools through "true private choice." 22 The Court found that the
voucher program at issue in Zelman fell into the latter
category,23 finding it particularly significant that "the.. .program
is neutral in all respects toward religion."24 Thus, the most
20 See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 648 (2002) (reversing Court of
Appeals, who had struck down program that effectively advanced religion); see also
Joshua Edelstein, Note, Zelman, Davey, and the Case for Mandatory Government
Funding for Religious Education, 46 ARIZ. L. REV. 151, 152 (2004) (calling Zelman what
appears to be Court's biggest step toward government inclusion of religion); Jason M.
Hall, Student Symposium, Religious Schools After Zelman v. Simmons-Harris: Financing
Religious Educational Institutions with Tax-Exempt Public Bind Process, 83 B.U. L. REV.
685, 698 (2003) (explaining Zelman's holding that parents may use vouchers provided by
government at either sectarian private or secular schools, without violating
Establishment Clause).
21 See Zelman, 536 U.S. at 648-49 (discussing how other part of this modified test
was satisfied, in that there was no dispute that the law was enacted for any valid secular
purpose); see also id. at 668 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citing Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S.
203, 218, 232-33 (1997)) (observing that Supreme Court had folded third Lemon prong, or
"excessive entanglement" question, into effects inquiry to try to reconcile case with
previous Supreme Court precedent); ACLU v. McCreary County, 354 F.3d 438, 464 (6th
Cir. 2003) (stating that Court further modified Lemon test in Zelman with O'Connor's
concurrence that folds entanglement inquiry into primary effect inquiry); Sara J.
Crisafulli, Comment, Zelman v. Simmons-Harris: Is the Supreme Court's Latest Word on
School Voucher Programs Really the Last Word?, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 2227, 2281 n.51
(2003) (explaining Zelman Court's use of modified Lemon test found in Agostini, "which
restated the primary criteria the Court used in Establishment Clause challenges to
'evaluate whether government aid has the effect of advancing religion"').
22 Zelman, 536 U.S. at 649. See Brian K. Gran & Laurel Gaddie, Changing
Boundaries: Child Abuse, Public Health, and Separation of Church and State, 21 BUFF.
PUB. INTEREST L.J. 1, 19 (2002/2003) (discussing Zelman decision that distinguishes
programs of true private choice from those that directly provide aid to religious schools
and programs); Sean T. McLaughlin, More Than Meets the Eye: President Bush's Faith-
Based Initiative, 33 U. MEM. L. REV. 41, 69 (2002) (citing Zelman in discussing Bush's
plan to offer public funds to both religious and non-religious organizations and allow
recipients to enjoy true public choice upon obtaining indirect aid).
23 See Zelman, 536 U.S. at 653 (concluding that the program is neutral towards
religion); Steele v. Indus. Dev. Bd., 301 F.3d 401, 440 (6th Cir. 2002) (noting Zelman
conclusion that Court's decisions consistently distinguish between those government
programs providing directly to religious schools, and programs of true private choice); see
also Prince v. Jacoby, 303 F.3d 1074, 1093 (9th Cir. 2002) (discussing Zelman decision--
that programs of true private choice do not offend Establishment Clause).
24 Zelman, 536 U.S. at 653-54 (postulating that this is significant because the
program does not impermissibly create incentives or preferences for religious schools as
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recent Supreme Court precedent suggests that programs that are
neutral toward religion, where aid to religion only results from
the intermediary choice of the recipient of the funds, will not
violate the Establishment Clause. The next question, which was
at issue in Locke v. Davey, is whether the Free Exercise Clause
requires programs that are made generally available on an
otherwise neutral basis to be made available to those who would
use the funds for religious purposes.
B. The Free Exercise Clause
The Constitution provides that, "Congress shall make no
law.. .prohibiting the free exercise [of religion]."25 This provision
has, in a similar manner to the Establishment Clause, been
incorporated to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.26
Generally, the Free Exercise clause is implicated in two different
types of cases:27 those in which the government directly tries to
restrict a religious practice or discriminate on the basis of
religion 28 and those in which an individual seeks an exemption
opposed to secular ones; but instead actually create disincentives for religious (and
presumably non-religious) private schools by making students who choose to go to them
eligible for less aid than at community or magnet schools).
25 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
26 See Presbyterian Church v. Hull Mem'l Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 447 n.4
(1969) (stating that Fourteenth Amendment protects First Amendment from state action);
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940) (holding that "Fourteenth Amendment
has rendered the legislatures of the states as incompetent as Congress to enact such
laws"); see also Erwin Chemerinsky, Access to Justice: The Rehnquist Court & Justice: An
Oxymoron? 1 WASH. U. J.L. & POLY 37, 38 (1999) (citing Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507,
534-36 (1997), which declared Religious Freedom Restoration Act unconstitutional and
affirmed that Congress, when acting under Fourteenth Amendment power, may not
create or expand scope of rights).
27 See Gabrielle Giselle Davison, Note, The "Extreme and Hypothetical" Come to Life:
The Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 43 CATH. U. L. REV. 641,
669 (1994) (stating that government neutrality under Free Exercise Clause can take two
different forms: enacting laws that do not discriminate against religion, and
accommodating religious groups by exempting them from even formally neutral laws); see
also Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of
Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1409, 1411 (1990) (framing Free Exercise question as whether
clause requires exemptions or merely prevents discrimination based on religion); Stephen
S. Kao, The President's Guidelines on Religious Exercise and Religious Expression in the
Federal Workplace: A Restatement or Reinterpretation of Law?, 8 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 251,
277 (1999) (stating that government law implicates Free Exercise Clause of First
Amendment if it facially discriminates against employees' private exercise of religion or is
intended to infringe upon or limit exercise of private religion).
28 See McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 621 (1978) (preventing ministers from serving
as constitutional delegates or legislators); Torasco v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 489 (1961)
(requiring religious oath to be eligible for public office); Falwell v. Miller, 203 F. Supp. 2d
624, 626 (W.D. Va. 2002) (refusing to grant corporate charter to one church and its
trustees).
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from the laws or practices of a state because of his or her
religious beliefs.29 The former, given the language of the First
Amendment, is a much easier case, and is therefore much rarer
than the latter.30 Such cases are not unheard of however;
generally, they arise when the government places a condition on
the exercise of a right3l or the conferral of a benefit. 32
Early Free Exercise cases were quick to reject requests for
religious exemptions. 33 The Court shifted from this course in
Sherbert v. Verner,34 when it required the government to show a
compelling interest in order to sustain a law that places a burden
on the free exercise of religion.35 Sherbert involved a Seventh
Day Adventist's challenge to a South Carolina law that required
an employee to work on Saturday36  to be eligible for
29 See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 401-02 (1963) (requesting exemption for
unemployment compensation laws); Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 600-01 (1961)
(demanding exemption from Sunday closing laws); Gallagher v. Crown Kosher Super
Market Inc., 366 U.S. 617, 618-19 (1961) (seeking exemption from Sunday closing laws).
30 See William P. Marshall, The Case Against the Constitutionally Compelled Free
Exercise Exemption, 40 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 357, 374 (1990) (stating there have been few
instances where one law has infringed on religious freedom); McConnell, supra note 27, at
1413 (noting how majority of Free Exercise cases dealt with religious exemption claims).
See generally Michelle O'Connor, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act: Exactly what
Rights Does it "Restore" in the Federal Tax Context? 36 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 321, 323-24 (2004)
(discussing how Free Exercise challenges tend to arise when people cannot follow laws of
their religious beliefs).
31 See McDaniel, 435 U.S. at 626 (plurality opinion) (holding that states may not
condition exercising one right on relinquishing another ); Torasco, 367 U.S. at 496
(holding that Maryland law requiring public employees to take oath asserting belief in
God violates Free Exercise Clause); Falwell, 203 F. Supp. 2d at 633 (holding that states
may not prohibit churches from incorporating).
32 See Tex. Monthly v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 15 (1989) (stating government cannot
provide unjustifiable awards to religious organizations); McDaniel, 435 U.S. at 639
(Brennan, J., concurring) (arguing that "government may not use religion as a basis of
classification for the imposition of duties, penalties, privileges or benefits"); see also Regan
v. Taxation with Representation, 461 U.S. 540, 545 (1983) (citing Perry v. Sindermann,
408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972)) (asserting how government may not deny benefits to people
because they exercise constitutional rights).
33 See Braunfeld, 366 U.S. at 609 (holding exemption to Sunday closing laws was not
required for those of Jewish Orthodox faith); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 170
(1944) (refusing to grant exemption to child labor laws to Jehovah's witness); Reynolds v.
U.S., 98 U.S. 145, 166-67 (1878) (finding no exemption for Mormons on criminalization of
polygamy).
34 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
35 See id. at 403 (observing that, for South Carolina's statute to survive constitutional
challenge, it must either "represent no infringement" on free exercise or "be justified by a
'compelling state interest"'); see also McConnell, supra note 27, at 1412 (stating that
statute cannot enforce its limitations when it conflicts with sincere religious practices);
Prabha Sipi Bhandari, Note, The Failure of Equal Regard to Explain the Sherbert
Quartet, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 97, 97 (1997) (stating that South Carolina's statute failed
compelling state interest's test).
36 See Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 399 n.1 (noting "there [is no] doubt that the prohibition
against Saturday labor is a basic tenet of the Seventh-day Adventist creed, based upon
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unemployment benefits. 37 Finding that strict scrutiny was not
satisfied in the case, the Court struck down the law as a violation
of the Free Exercise clause as applied to the appellant. 38
The Court continued on in this. vein, requiring religious
exemptions to otherwise valid state laws 39 until Employment
Division v. Smith,40 when the Court radically altered its
approach to Free Exercise cases.41 Smith involved an Oregon law
that regulated the possession of controlled substances and the
that religion's interpretation of the Holy Bible"). See generally Michael Silversmith &
Jack Guggenheim, Between Heaven and Earth: The Interrelationship Between Intellectual
Property Rights and the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment, 52 ALA. L. REV. 467,
472 (2001) (stating that plaintiff must show good reason why she cannot work on
Saturday); Christopher Andrew Eason, Note, 0 Centro v. Ashcroft: American Indians'
Efforts to Secure Religious Freedoms Are Paving the Way for Other Minority Religious
Groups, 28 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 327, 329 (2003/2004) (explaining that plaintiff cannot
refuse to work Saturdays because of religious reasons).
37 See Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 399-400. Specifically, the appellant in the case was fired
from her job because she refused to work on Saturdays. Id. After trying to find alternate
employment and encountering no employer who would hire her for a five-day work week
instead of six, she applied for unemployment benefits. Id. at 399-400. The South Carolina
Unemployment Compensation Act provides that to be eligible for benefits, the claimant
must show that she was "able to work and is available to work." Id. at 400-01. It also
provides that any claimant who "has failed, without good cause... to apply for available
suitable work. . .[or] to accept available suitable work when offered" will be ineligible for
benefits. Id. at 401. The Employment Security Commission found that the appellant fit
under the second category, finding that her rejection of available work because of her
religious beliefs was not "good cause," and denied her unemployment benefits. Id.
38 See Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 407-09 (finding lack of compelling government interest to
support South Carolina law); see also McConnell, supra note 27, at 1412 (forcing state to
carve out exception to statute for people who cannot comply because of their religious
beliefs); Bhandari, supra note 35, at 97 (stating that South Carolina's statute failed
compelling state interest test).
39 See Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm. of Fla., 480 U.S. 136, 139 (1987)
(holding Florida's disqualification of appellant from receipt of unemployment benefits
after being discharged from job for refusal to work on her Sabbath); Wisconsin v. Yoder,
406 U.S. 205, 234-35 (1972) (holding that Wisconsin's law making attendance at school
until age sixteen compulsory is unconstitutional as applied to Amish families who keep
their children out of formal high school education for religious reasons). But see Lyng v.
Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 441-42 (1988) (holding that
federal land used for religious purposes of American Indian tribes can be used as
government sees fit without violating Free Exercise Clause); Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693,
699-00 (1986) (rejecting Native American's claim that use of social security numbers to
identify people by various government programs violates Free Exercise Clause).
40 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
41 See Kenneth Marin, Note, Employment Division v. Smith: The Supreme Court
Alters the State of Free Exercise Doctrine, 40 AM. U. L. REV. 1431, 1431 (1991) (noting in
Smith how "Supreme Court severely limited the scope of the free exercise clause"); see
also Ira C. Lupu, Employment Division v. Smith and the Decline of Supreme Court-
Centrism, 1993 BYU L. REV. 259, 260 (1993) [hereinafter Lupu, Employment Division]
(criticizing Smith as "substantively wrong and institutionally irresponsible"); Michael W.
McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1109,
1111 (1990) (isolating two of many ways Smith can be criticized). But see William P.
Marshall, In Defense of Smith and Free Exercise Revisionism, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 308, 308
(1991) (defending Court's rejection of compelling interest test in religious exemption
cases).
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denial of unemployment benefits to two former employees of a
drug rehabilitation clinic because they had been discharged from
that employment for ingestion of peyote. 42 The Court granted
certiorari to consider whether the state's regulation of peyote
without an exemption for religious use43 violated the Free
Exercise Clause. 44 The Court found the prohibition to be
constitutional. 45 In doing so, the Court discarded the "compelling
interest" test of Sherbert46 and established a new test: laws that
are neutral and of general applicability that have only an
incidental burden on the practice of religion do not violate the
Free Exercise Clause.47 The Court found it important that there
42 Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 874 (1990) (noting Oregon law
prohibiting knowing or intentional possession of controlled substances unless prescribed
by medical practitioners); see also OR. ADMIN. R. 855-080-0021(3)(v)(2004) (explaining
that peyote is one "controlled substance" regulated under Oregon's criminal possession
statute); Peyote Way Church. v. Smith, 742 F.2d 193, 195 (5th Cir. 1984) (defining peyote
as "small spineless cactus that grows along the Rio Grande River. Its stems have jointed
tubercules or 'buttons' that, when ingested, have a hallucinogenic effect").
43 See Smith, 494 U.S. at 875-76 (vacating and remanding case to Oregon Supreme
Court to determine whether respondent's conduct violated Oregon's criminal code;
therefore, Court heard case once before, but found itself unable to decide it because it did
not know whether Oregon penal law distinguished between uses of peyote for religious
purposes as opposed to other purposes); see also Smith v. Employment Div., 763 P. 2d 146,
148 (Or. 1988) (announcing that Oregon Supreme Court found that penal law did not
make this distinction; as such, this was a violation of the Free Exercise Clause); cf. OR.
REV. STAT. § 475.992(5)(a)-(c) (2001) (clarifying that currently, Oregon allows an
affirmative defense to its controlled substances law allowing for use of peyote: in
connection with a good faith practice of a religious belief, directly associated with a
religious practice, and if the use "is not dangerous to the health of the user or others who
are in the proximity of the user").
44 See Smith, 494 U.S. at 876-77 (noting that Constitution's Free Exercise Clause
disables Congress from making law that prohibits free exercise of religion); McDaniel v.
Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 626 (1978) (noting that "Free Exercise Clause categorically prohibits
government from regulating, prohibiting, or rewarding religious beliefs"); Sherbert v.
Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963) (citations omitted) (emphasis added) (stating that "the
door of the Free Exercise Clause stands tightly closed against any governmental
regulation of religious beliefs as such").
45 See Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878-79 (1990) (noting that
Supreme Court has "[n]ever held that an individual's religious beliefs excuse him from
compliance with an otherwise valid law prohibiting conduct that the State is free to
regulate"); see also Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 594-95 (1940) (holding
that "[c]onscientious scruples have not, in the course of the long struggle for religious
toleration, relieved the individual from obedience to a general law not aimed at the
promotion or restriction of religious beliefs"); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166-
67 (1879) (rejecting claim that criminal laws against polygamy could not be
constitutionally applied to those whose religion commanded such practice).
46 See Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 406 (questioning whether "compelling state interest
enforced in the eligibility provisions of the South Carolina statute justifies the substantial
infringement of appellant's First Amendment right").
47 See Smith, 494 U.S. at 878 (expressing belief that 'permissible' reading of First
Amendment text is 'correct'); see also id. at 881 (noting that Court did allow for some
generally applicable laws to violate Free Exercise Clause, but only if law also burdened
some other constitutional protection); cf. Kathleen P. Kelly, Note, Abandoning the
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was no evidence that the state's regulation of the use of peyote
was an attempt to regulate religious belief or conduct, and held
that in the absence of such a showing, the rule previously
enunciated should control. 48
The Court continued to reaffirm the rule of Smith without
much elucidation49 until it decided Church of the Lukumi Babalu
Aye v. City of Hialeah.50 That case involved three city ordinances
passed in response to the opening of a church associated with the
Santeria faith.51 These laws were aimed in particular at animal
sacrifice, 52 a practice central to the Santeria faith.53 The Court
Compelling Interest Test in Free Exercise Cases: Employment Division, Dep't of Human
Resources v. Smith, 40 CATH. U. L. REV. 929, 955-56 (1991) (discussing 'hybrid' cases
alluded to in Smith). See generally, Jesse H. Choper, Article, The Free Exercise Clause: A
Structural Overview and an Appraisal of Recent Developments, 27 WM AND MARY L. REV.
943, 947-48 (1986) (noting divide when "Court has read the establishment clause as
saying that if a law's purpose is to aid religion, it is unconstitutional. On the other hand;
the Court has read the free exercise clause as saying that, under certain circumstances,
the state must aid religion.").
48 See Smith, 494 U.S. at 882 (holding "there being no contention that Oregon's drug
law represents an attempt to regulate religious beliefs, the communication of religious
beliefs, or the raising of one's children in those beliefs, the rule to which we have adhered
ever since Reynolds plainly controls"). See generally Gillette, 401 U.S. at. 461 (noting that
"our cases do not at their farthest reach support the proposition that a stance of
conscientious opposition relieves an objector from any colliding duty fixed by a democratic
government"); Hamilton v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 293 U.S. 245, 264 (1934) (explaining
that "privilege of the native-born conscientious objector to avoid bearing arms comes not
from the Constitution but from the acts of Congress... [which] may grant or withhold the
exemption as in its wisdom it sees fit; and if it be withheld, the native-born conscientious
objector cannot successfully assert the privilege").
49 See, e.g., Minnesota v. Hershberger, 495 U.S. 901, 901 (1990) (vacating and
remanding for decision in light of Smith); City of Seattle v. First Covenant Church, 499
U.S. 901, 901 (1991) (vacating and remanding for decision in light of Smith); cf. McDaniel
v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 628 (1978) (citations omitted) (explaining that "[o]nly those
interests of the highest order and those not otherwise served can overbalance legitimate
claims to the free exercise of religion").
50 508 U.S. 520 (1993) (finding ordinance unconstitutional by applying strict scrutiny
analysis).
51 Id. at 525-28 (explaining targeted elements of Santeria religion); cf. 13
Encyclopedia of Religion 66 (M. Eliade ed. 1987) (describing practices of Santeria
religion). See generally 1 Encyclopedia of the American Religious Experience 183 (C.
Lippy & P. Williams eds. 1988) (describing religious experiences of Santeria religion).
52 See Lukumi Babalu Aye, 508 U.S. at 527-28 (noting that two ordinances defined
,sacrifice' as arguably commensurate with practicing religion and provided exceptions for
those killing animals for food); see also id. at 528 (explaining that third ordinance
prohibited killing animals for food, i.e. 'slaughter,' within certain areas, but also provided
exemptions); Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 723 F. Supp 1467, 1471 (S.D.
Fla. 1989) (explaining that "[a]nimals, including chickens, pigeons, doves, ducks, guinea
fowl, goats, sheep, and turtles, are sacrificed as an integral part of the rituals and
ceremonies conducted by practitioners of Santeria."). See generally Paul L. Bader, Note,
Church of the Lukumi Babalu v. City of Hialeah, 44 MERCER L. REV. 1357, 1358 (1993)
(nothing how Court "adopted the conclusions of the defendant's expert witness, Dr.
Michael Fox ... and found that this was not a reliable or painless method of killing an
animal").
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began by reaffirming Smith before going on to define more
precisely the standard to be applied. 54 The Court noted that,
while the words used in the ordinances, i.e. "sacrifice" and
"ritual," are words with "strong religious connotations," they also
have secular meanings; therefore, the ordinances in question
could not be deemed not to be neutral on their faces. 55 The Court
did consider the use of these particular words significant, 56
especially when coupled with the text of other ordinances
referring specifically to certain religious practices as the
motivation for the law5 7 as well as the fact that the operation of
the statute targeted the Santeria religion.58 The Court concluded
53 See Lukumi Babalu Aye, 508 U.S. at 525 (describing significance of animal sacrifice
to Santeria); Ira Lupu, The Lingering Death of Separationism, 62 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 230,
264 (1994) [hereinafter Lupu, Lingering Death] (describing animal sacrifice as one 'central
element' of Santeria religion); Eric Levine, Comment, The Constitutionality of Court
Ordered Cesarean Surgery: A Threshold Question, 4 ALB. L. SC. & TECH. 229, 298 (1994)
(noting how animal sacrifice is central to Santeria faith).
54 See Lukumi Babalu Aye, 508 U.S. at 532-33 (defining religion neutral laws as
those without purpose to disapprove of one religion nor purpose to infringe upon practices
because of their religious motivation); see also Lupu, Employment Division, supra note 41,
at 265 (explaining that neutrality requirement bars both overt and covert discrimination
against religious minorities). See generally Lupu, Lingering Death, supra note 53, at 264
(noting that ordinances in Lukumi were "not neutral with respect to religion, nor...
generally applicable").
55 See Lukumi Babalu Aye, 508 U.S. at 533-34 (noting whether words such as
'sacrifice' and 'ritual' are of religious or secular origin is inconclusive). But see Kris
Banvard, Comment, Exercise in Frustration? A New Attempt by Congress to Restore Strict
Scrutiny to Governmental Burdens on Religious Practice, 31 CAP. U. L. REV. 279, 297
(2003) (stating that ordinances in Lukumi "failed to reach a range of secular conduct that
had effects similar to those of the religious rituals [of Santerians]"); Renee Skinner, The
Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah: Still Sacrificing Free Exercise,
46 BAYLOR L. REV. 259, 271 (1994) (stating that ordinances in Lukumi were not facially
neutral).
56 See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 534 (1993)
(debating whether words 'sacrifice' and 'ritual' are of secular or religious nature); cf.
Skinner, supra note 55, at 271 (stating that ordinances in Lukumi "targeted the religion
by their own terms"). See generally Banvard, supra note 57, at 296 (noting importance of
facial neutrality).
57 See Lukumi Babalu Aye, 508 U.S. at 534-35 (discussing hostility shown to Santeria
religion through text and legislative history of such ordinances); see also Skinner, supra
note 55, at 271 (stating that ordinances in Lukumi "targeted the religion by their own
terms"). See generally Silversmith & Guggenheim, supra note 36, at 474 (discussing likely
unconstitutionality of laws that only target religiously-motivated conduct).
58 See Lukumi Babalu Aye, 508 U.S. at 535-36 (noting numerous exceptions to
ordinance application, apparently including slaughter for kosher purposes, which seemed
to prohibit only Santeria religion's ritualistic sacrifice); see also Banvard, supra note 55,
at 297 (noting that Lukumi held that such ordinances "failed to reach a range of secular
conduct that had effects similar to those of the religious rituals [of Santerians]"); Skinner,
supra note 55, at 271 (stating that Lukumi found such ordinances had "effect of creating a
religious gerrymander").
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that the law was not neutral,59 nor of general applicability;
hence, strict scrutiny should be applied.60 In applying strict
scrutiny, the Court found, largely on the analysis it had already
engaged in, that the laws could not withstand such heightened
scrutiny. 6 1
One question left unresolved by the Court was whether the
Free Exercise Clause required a showing of animosity toward
religion before a person would have a valid constitutional claim.
In the only portion of his opinion not to command a majority of
the Court, Justice Kennedy suggested that showing a history
that attempts to target certain practices because of religious
motivation would be a relevant factor for consideration, but he
did not directly state that such a showing would be required.62
Justice Scalia, in a concurrence explaining his reasons for not
joining that portion of Justice Kennedy's opinion, suggested that
such a showing would not be necessary to find a Free Exercise
Clause violation.63 Still, the major dividing line in Free Exercise
59 See Lukumi Babalu Aye, 508 U.S. at 542 (finding city ordinances had aim of
suppressing religion); see also Lupu, Lingering Death, supra note 53, at 264 (noting
Court's finding that these ordinances "were not neutral with respect to religion"); see also
Lupu, Employment Division, supra note 41, at 265 (stating that Court in Lukumi
unanimously agreed that these challenged ordinances were religious gerrymander).
60 See Lukumi Babalu Aye, 508 U.S. at 543 (concluding that these ordinances were
not generally applicable); see also Lupu, Lingering Death, supra note 53, at 264 (noting
that ordinances in Lukumi were not generally applicable); Elizabeth Trujillo, Note, City of
Boerne v. Flores: Religious Free Exercise Pays a High Price for the Supreme Court's
Retaliation on Congress, 36 HOUSTON L. REV. 645, 654-55 (1999) (stating that ordinances
targeted one specific religious group).
61 See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 546-47
(1993) (holding ordinances restricting Santerian religious practices were not justified by
any compelling government interest nor were they narrowly tailored to any government
interest); see also Lupu, Lingering Death, supra note 53, at 265 (noting that ordinances at
issue were unconstitutional); Skinner, supra note 55, at 271 (affirming how these
ordinances in Lukumi "failed ... the compelling interest test").
62 See Lukumi Babalu Aye, 508 U.S. at 540-42 (discussing ordinances' legislative
history that indicated hostility to Santeria religion); see also Lupu, Lingering Death,
supra note 53, at 264 (stating that ordinances' 'enactment history' "made clear that
suppression of... the Santeria worship service was the object of the ordinances");
Skinner, supra note 55, at 274 (stating that ordinances' legislative history led to
conclusion "that the City of Hialeah's primary motive was to... stop the Santeros from
practicing their religion").
63 See Lukumi Babalu Aye, 508 U.S. at 558-59 (Scalia, J., concurring) (noting that
legislative purpose should not be part of First Amendment consideration and that Court
should consider only whether "the law... in fact singles out a religious practice for
special burdens"); see also Jeffrey Williams, Note, Humphrey v. Lane: The Ohio
Constitution's David Slays the Goliath of Employment Division, Department of Human
Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 34 AKRON L. REV 919, 941 (2001) (noting relevant criteria
are law's neutrality and general applicability); see also Levine, supra note 53, at 297
(stating that strict scrutiny was not applied to this criminal law because such law was
neutral and generally applicable).
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Clause jurisprudence up to the time Locke was decided has been
the dichotomy drawn between Smith and Lukumi, requiring only
a rational basis analysis for laws of general applicability that
might impact religious practice, but requiring strict scrutiny of
laws that target or otherwise single out a practice that is
undertaken for religious reasons. 64
C. The Relationship between the Two Religion Clauses
The Court has long observed a certain and inevitable tension
between the two religion clauses of the First Amendment.65
Scholars have also recognized the tension, but have been quick to
blame this tension not on the language of the two clauses;
instead, they blame it on the Court's interpretation of the two
clauses separately, 66 and suggest possible ways to alleviate that
Court-created tension.67 The most definitive statement on the
relationship between the two clauses, and perhaps an attempt to
64 See Lukumi Babalu Aye, 508 U.S. at 531-32 (holding that laws that are neither
neutral nor generally applicable "must be justified by a compelling government interest
and must be narrowly tailored to advance that interest"); see also Levine, supra note 53,
at 298 (noting applicability of strict scrutiny to laws that are not neutral and not
generally applicable); Silversmith & Guggenheim, supra note 36, at 474 (stating that
strict scrutiny applies to laws that target only conduct with religious motivation).
65 See Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 677 (1971) (noting "internal tension in the
First Amendment between the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause");
Sylvia Sohn Penneys, Note, And Now for a Moment of Silence: Wallace v. Jaffree, 39 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 935, 940 (1985) (recognizing potential tension between these two clauses if
both are interpreted broadly). See generally Katie Hosford, Notes & Comments, The
Search For a Distinct Religious - Liberty Jurisprudence under the Washington State
Constitution, 75 WASH. L. REV. 643, 644 (2000) (claiming that "free exercise and
separation of church and state have potential to lead to contradictory results").
66 See Carl H. Esbeck, Religion in the Public Square: Religion and the First
Amendment: Some Causes of the Recent Confusion, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 883, 893
(2001) (arguing that such conflicts between said Religion Clauses are extrinsic and
avoidable); John Witte, Jr., American Legal History: The Integration of Religious Liberty,
90 MICH. L. REV. 1363, 1369 (1992) (noting that "drafters did not prefer one religion
clause over the other or perceive any tension between the two"). See generally William
Cox, Jr., The Original Meaning of the Establishment Clause and Its Application and
Education, 13 REGENT. U.L. REV. 111, 113 (2000/2001) (claiming that "for the greater part
of this century, the Court has been without a principled basis for interpreting the religion
clauses of the First Amendment").
67 See Esbeck, supra note 66, at 894 (arguing if Court applies neutrality principles, no
tension exists between these two clauses). See generally Hosford, supra note 65, at 645
(alleging "because the First Amendment describes the appropriate relationship between
religion and the state in just two short clauses, federal courts have developed detailed
tests to guide them in the two distinct areas of jurisprudence concerning religion:
establishment and free exercise of religion"); Robert Jackson, Jr., Comment, A Call to
Secure Religious Exercise Under the Mississippi Constitution, 62 MISS. L.J. 133, 136
(1992) (claiming Supreme Court has employed balancing processes of respective interests
to determine if government must accommodate religious interests by providing
exemptions from general rules").
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relieve the purported tension between the clauses, 68 comes from
the Court's decision in Walz v. Tax Commissioner of New York.69
There, the Court noted that there was room for a "play in the
joints" between the two clauses, meaning things prohibited by
one clause were not required by the other. This thereby leaves
room for the states to experiment with greater free exercise or
establishment provisions. 70 The Court has since, after Walz but
prior to Locke, looked with favor upon this principle. 71 On the
other hand, the Court has also recognized that a state's interest
in a stricter separation of church and state is limited by other
provisions of the Constitution, including the Free Exercise
Clause.72 Reading the clauses together, the key focus, according
to Walz, should be "[a]dherence to the policy of neutrality" that is
68 See Rezai, supra note 14, at 514 n.68 (citing Walz for proposition of relieving
tension between these two clauses). See generally Hosford, supra note 65, at 644 (claiming
this relationship between Constitution's two religious clauses leads to potential
contradictory results); Jackson, supra note 67, at 136 (claiming that "the inclusion of both
restraints upon the power of Congress to legislate concerning religious matters shows
unmistakably that the framers of the First Amendment were not content to rest the
protection of religious liberty exclusively upon either clause").
69 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
70 See id. at 669 (deducing from court jurisprudence and the First Amendment itself
that, "we will not tolerate either governmentally established religion or governmental
interference with religion .... there is room for play in the joints productive of a
benevolent neutrality which will permit religious exercise to exist without sponsorship
and without interference"). See generally Allison Hensey, Comment, A Comparison of
Religious Expression Doctrine under the United States and Oregon Constitutions, 75 OR.
L. REV. 1253, 1254 (1996) (discussing tension in First Amendment law between
"protection of religious expression and worship in the Free Speech and Free Exercise
Clause and prohibition against an establishment of religion by the state in the
Establishment Clause"); Hosford, supra note 65, at 644 (claiming Free Exercise Clause
"requires that government refrain from inhibiting the free exercise of religion, while the
Establishment Clause simultaneously requires that government refrain from 'respecting'
religion").
71 See Witters v. Wash. Dep't of Servs. for the Blind, 493 U.S. 850, 850 (1989) (Witters
!M) (denying certiorari after remand of case on question of whether Washington's stricter
establishment clause provision violates federal Free Exercise Clause); Witters v. Wash.
Dep't of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 484-85 (1986) (Witters II) (declining to
consider Free Exercise question associated with Washington's more restrictive
establishment provision). But see McMonagle v. Northeast Women's Ctr., 493 U.S. 901,
903-04 (1989) (White, J., dissenting) (arguing Court should have granted certiorari in
Witters IV because the "case presents important federal questions regarding the free
exercise rights of citizens who participate in state aid programs.. .and regarding the
extent to which state involvement that does not violate the Establishment Clause is
required by the Free Exercise Clause").
72 See Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 276 (1981) (holding that Establishment
Clause requires states to distinguish between "religious speech and nonreligious speech,
the primary effect of which is not to support an establishment of religion"); Hensey, supra
note 70, at 1254 (stating that, under the Free Exercise clause, states "may not impede an
individual's freedom of religion expression or workshop"); Hosford, supra note 65, at 644
(stating that Constitution ensures "Congress cannot pass laws that inhibit the free
exercise of religion").
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required by both clauses with respect to religion. 73 The Court
defines this inquiry as considering "whether particular acts in
question are intended to establish or interfere with religious
beliefs and practices or have the effect of doing so." 74 The Court,
largely because Walz was an Establishment Clause case,75
focused its "play in the joints" analysis on what it termed the
"benevolent neutrality"76 of the state, which is the state creating
accommodations for religious practice without running into an
Establishment Clause violation. Still, much of the language of
the Court speaks to the interpretation of both clauses, and the
Court ultimately articulates a goal of "permit[ting] religious
exercise to exist without sponsorship and without interference."77
This was largely the state of Religion Clause jurisprudence prior
to Locke: allowing the states the discretion on whether or not to
73 See Walz v. Tax Comm'n of N.Y., 397 U.S. 664, 669-70 (1970) (holding "there is
room for play in the joints productive of a benevolent neutrality which will permit
religious exercise to exist without sponsorship and without interference"). See generally
Shawn P. Bailey, The Establishment Clause and The Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, 16 REGENT U. L. REV. 53, 53 (2003/2004) (affirming
Establishment Clause requires neutrality toward religion); Gabriel A. Moens, The Menace
of Neutrality in Religion, 2004 BYU L. REV. 535, 536 (2004) (stating "Supreme Court has
interpreted the Establishment Clause as requiring or involving the application of the
neutrality principle").
74 Walz, 397 U.S. at 669 (holding "each value judgment under the Religion Clauses
must therefore turn on whether particular acts in question are intended to establish or
interfere with religious beliefs and practices or have the effect of doing so"). See generally
United States v. Lewis, 638 F. Supp. 573, 577 (Mich. S.D.1986) (noting that "court must
determine whether the state action interferes with or burdens the individual's religious
belief'); Mohammad v. Sommers, 238 F. Supp. 806, 811 (Mich. N.D. 1964) (holding 'laws
are made for the government of actions, and while they cannot interfere with mere
religious belief and opinions, they may with practices").
75 See Walz, 397 U.S. at 670-72 (examining prior Establishment Clause
jurisprudence). See generally Tex. Monthly v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1989) (holding said
"Establishment Clause prohibits government from abandoning secular purposes in order
to put an imprimatur on one religion, or on religion as such, or to favor the adherents of
any sect or religious organization"); Pub. Funds for Pub. Sch. v. Byrne, 590 F.2d 514,
519 (3d Cir. 1979) (noting "analysis required in cases concerning the Establishment
Clause has been compared to the adjudication of equal protection cases").
76 Walz, 397 U.S. at 669 (postulating that there is room for play in joints productive of
benevolent neutrality). See generally Bailey, supra note 73, at 53 (establishing such
phrase "benevolent neutrality" refers to government accommodation of religion); Moens,
supra note 73, at 536 (asserting that this neutrality principle "imposes an obligation on
federal and state governments to refrain from favoring or disfavoring either sectarianism
or secularism").
77 Walz, 397 U.S. at 669 (holding that such benevolent neutrality will permit religious
exercise to exist without sponsorship and without interference). See Bailey, supra note 75,
at 53 (reiterating "prohibition of governmental interference with religion refers to
autonomy of religious individuals and institutions that the First Amendment preserves");
Moens, supra note 73, at 536 (stating that neutrality principle "ineffectively addresses
the conflict between the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause and has
largely removed religion from American public life by trivializing its existence").
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accommodate religious practices so long as the laws themselves
are neutral toward religion. 78
III. LOCKE V. DAVEY
A. Facts
In 1999, the State of Washington established the Promise
Scholarship to assist students who achieved high marks in high
school but whose economic status might prevent them from
attending college. 79 This scholarship is made available to all
students who have met the criteria.8 0 These criteria require the
student applying for the scholarship to meet certain academic, 8 1
economic,8 2 and enrollment requirements.8 3 The scholarship
78 See Swaggart Ministries v. Bd. of Equalization of Cal., 493 U.S. 378, 394 (1990)
(holding that payment of applicable tax imposed no undue burden on religious
organization's practices or beliefs and thus, there was no threatened entanglement
between state and church); see also Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 593 (1988) (stating
that Adolescent Family Life Act was constitutional because it was neutral regarding
grantee's status); Boyajian v. Gatzunis, NO. 98-11763-DPW, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
15610, at *20-22 (D. Mass. 1999) (stating that zoning by-law and statute were neutral as
applied to church and did not violate Establishment Clause).
79 See Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 716 (2004) (noting how scholarship was
mandated by Washington Legislature after it found "an individual's economic
viability.. .[to be] contingent on postsecondary educational opportunities..." and that
students who "complete high school with high academic marks may not have the financial
ability to attend college"); see also Tony Mauro, Law School Student is Supreme Court
Celebrity, RECORDER, Dec. 1, 2003, at 1 (stating that Promise Scholarship is open to high-
achieving low-income high school graduates).
80 See Locke, 540 U.S. at 716 (noting how Locke court stated that this scholarship is
"evenly prorated among the eligible students"); see also WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 250-80-
050(2) (2003) (discussing criteria. See generally Katie Axtell, Note, Public Funding for
Theological Training Under the Free Exercise Clause: Pragmatic Implications and
Theoretical Questions Posed to the Supreme Court in Locke v. Davey, 27 SEATTLE U. L.
REV. 585, 588-89 (2003) (postulating how these criteria include academic and economic
requirements).
81 See WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 250-80-020(12)(b) (2003) (stating how students have to
be in top 15% of his high school graduating class to qualify); see also WASH. ADMIN. CODE
§ 250-80-020(12)(c-d) (2003) (affirming how, alternatively, students are eligible if they
obtain at least 1200 on their Scholastic Assessment Tests or 27 on their American College
Test); Axtell, supra note 80, at 588 (discussing 15% requirement).
82 See WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 250-80-020(e) (2004) (confirming student's family income
must be less than 135% of state's median); Axtell, supra note 80, at 588 (discussing 135%
rule); Derek D. Green, Note, Does Free Exercise Mean Free State Funding? In Davey v.
Locke, the Ninth Circuit Undervalued Washington's Vision of Religious Liberty, 78 WASH.
L. REV. 653, 653 (2003) (elaborating upon scholarship requirements).
83 See WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 250-80-020(12)(f) (2004) (affirming that students must
enroll at least half-time at 'eligible postsecondary' institutions); see also Axtell, supra note
80, at 588-89 (discussing institutions); WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 250-90-020(13)(a)-(b) (2004)
(defining 'eligible postsecondary education' as either "public institution[s] authorized by
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funds are not limited to tuition, but may also be spent on any
number of educational expenses.8 4 The scholarship program is
funded by the general fund of the state of Washington, and the
amount each recipient receives for a given year is dependent on
the appropriation for the program, which is spread evenly among
the recipients.8 5 Once a student applies for the scholarship and
meets the academic and income requirements, that student is
informed of his or her eligibility, which is contingent on meeting
the enrollment requirements.8 6  One of these enrollment
requirements is that the student must not be pursuing a degree
in theology2. 87  This requirement was included to ensure
compliance with both state statutory law8 8 and with the state
constitution, which prohibits 'public money' from going to
"religious instruction."89  The requirement more specifically
the Washington legislature" or any institution "physically located in the state of
Washington... [that] is accredited by a nationally recognized accrediting body").
84 See WASH. REV. CODE §28B.119.010(7) (2004) (noting "scholarships may be used for
any college-related expenses, including but not limited to, tuition, room and board, books,
and materials"); Locke v. Davey, 542 U.S. 712, 716 (2004) (stating that if student receives
Promise Scholarship, money may used for tuition or other educational expenses); see also
Green, supra note 82, at 653 (stating generally that Promise Scholarship was established
to provide state funding to qualified students).
85 See WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 250-80-050(2) (2003) (discussing amount students
receive from scholarship); see also WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 250-80-050(1) (2003) (noting
maximum annual award is limited to "the representative average annual tuition and fees
for resident students attending the state's community and technical colleges"); Locke, 540
U.S. at 717 (enumerating that award amounts at issue in Locke were for 1999-2000 and
2000-2001 academic years, when awards were $1,125 and $1,542 respectively).
86 See Locke, 540 U.S. at 716 (stating that students that complete enrollment
requirements are informed of eligibility); see also Ira C. Lupu & Robert Tuttle, Hitting the
Wall; Religion is Still Special Under the Constitution, Says the High Court, LEGAL TIMES,
Mar. 15, 2004, at 68 (stating that grants were awarded to qualified college students to use
at any accredited college as long as students did not major in 'devotional theology.'); Mike
McKee, Justices Say States May Deny Theology Scholarship Funds, LEGAL
INTELLIGENCER, Feb. 27, 2004, at 4 (noting that Promise Scholarship was awarded to
eligible needy students as long at they did not major in theology).
87 See WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 250-90-020(12)(g) (2003) (delineating enrollment
requirements); Tony Mauro, States Can Ban Scholarships for Theology, LEGAL TIMES,
Mar. 1, 2004, at 7 [hereinafter Mauro, States Can Ban] (stating that students that wish to
pursue theology degrees are ineligible for said Promise Scholarship); Tony Mauro, State
Aid for Divinity Study not Required, Court Rules, RECORDER, Feb. 26, 2004, at 3
[hereinafter Mauro, State Aid] (asserting that Promise Scholarships would be given to
needy students as long as they did not major in theology).
88 See WASH. REV. CODE § 28B.10.814 (2004) (providing that "[n]o aid [from a state
student financial aid program] shall be awarded to any student pursuing a degree in
theology"); Axtell, supra note 80, at 590 (quoting Washington statute that stated, "No aid
shall be awarded to any student who is pursuing a degree in theology"); Green, supra note
82, at 653 (stating that recipients of Promise Scholarships should not pursue theology
degrees to comply with state law).
89 See WASH. CONST., Art. I, § 11 (2004) (requiring protection of religious freedom in
that "[n]o public money or property shall be appropriated for or applied to any religious
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applies to devotional theology degrees. 90 Upon enrolling at an
eligible institution, it is that institution's responsibility and
prerogative to ensure the student meets the enrollment
requirements, including that the student is not pursuing a
degree in devotional theology. 91 If the student meets these final
requirements, the funds are distributed from the state to the
school, which then forwards them to the student.92
Joshua Davey was awarded the Promise Scholarship upon
initial state evaluation of his academic and economic merits. 93
He then decided to attend Northwest College, 94 a private college
worship, exercise or instruction"); see also WASH. CONST., Art. IX, § 4 (2004) (noting
Washington does have such a constitutional provision: "All schools maintained or
supported wholly or in part by public funds shall be forever free from sectarian control or
influence"); Locke, 124 S. Ct. at 1314 (debating that this is not one so-called state Blaine
Amendment, at least according to the Supreme Court; however, this provision was not at
issue in Locke partly because the Washington Supreme Court has interpreted as not
applying to institutions of higher education).
90 See Calvary Bible Presbyterian Church v. Board of Regents, 436 P.2d 189, 193
(Wash. 1967) (noting how this requirement comes not from statute or administrative
codes, but from Washington constitution, as interpreted by Washington Supreme Court,
which prohibits public money from going to "that category of instruction that resembles
worship and manifests a devotion to religion and religious principles in thought, feeling,
belief and conduct; i.e., instruction that is devotional in nature and designed to induce
faith and belief in the student"); see also Witters v. Comm'n for Blind, 771 P.2d 1119, 1121
(Wash. 1989) (discussing public money appropriation concerning religious institutions);
Wash. Health Care Facilities Auth. v. Spellman, 633 P.2d 866, 867 (Wash. 1981)
(elaborating how court has consistently held "no public money or property shall be
appropriated for or applied to any religious worship, exercise or instruction, or the
support of any religious establishment").
91 See WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 250-80-060(5) (2003) (stating that university can
disburse funds after verifying enrollment requirements); see also Locke, 124 S. Ct. at 1310
(noting institutions' responsibility to determine whether student is enrolled in devotional
major); Carlos S. Montoya, Constitutional Development: Locke v. Davey and the "Play In
The Joints" between the Religion Clause, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1159, 1161 (2004)
(clarifying that it was Northwest College which determined Davey did not meet
enrollment requirements).
92 See WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 250-80-060(5) (2003) (noting that "independent
university and the private vocational school must disburse the warrant once the student's
half-time or greater enrollment has been verified. The school may not withhold or delay
disbursement for any reason other than for less than half-time enrollment"); see also
Locke, 124 S. Ct. at 1310 (noting that scholarship funds are sent to institutions for
disbursement). See generally Montoya, supra note 93, at 1161 (describing process of
disbursing scholarship funds).
93 See Locke v. Davey, 124 S. Ct. 1307, 1310 (2004) (stating that Davey was initially
awarded Promise Scholarship); see also Locke v. Davey, 124 S. Ct. 1307, NAT'L L. J., Aug.
2, 2004, at 1 (noting that Davey initially won scholarship); Vuoto Loredana, Second Class
Citizens?, AM. ENTER., June 1, 2004, at 1 (observing that Davey was initially awarded
scholarship but then had his scholarship taken away).
94 See Locke, 124 S. Ct. at 1310 (noting Northwest College as one eligible institution
under said Promise Scholarship Program.); see also WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 250-80-020
(2003) (listing Northwest Association of Schools and Colleges as one accrediting body
specifically recognized by Washington state for Promise Scholarship eligibility); James J.
Kilpatrick, High Court Gets Murky Over What's 'Free, AUGUSTA CHRON., March 7, 2004,
at 1 (deeming Northwest College one accredited institution).
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in Seattle affiliated with the Assemblies of God church. 95 Davey's
goal was to become a minister, and pursuant to that goal, he
chose a double major in pastoral studies 96 and business
management/administration. 97 At the beginning of his first year
at Northwest, he met with the director of financial aid for the
College, who informed him that he could not use his scholarship
in pursuit of the pastoral studies degree. 98 He was told at that
time that the Promise Scholarship Program required him to sign
a form indicating that he was not pursuing any devotional
theology degree. 99 He refused to sign and continued on at
Northwest without receipt of the funds.OO
95 See Locke, 124 S. Ct. at 1310 (noting that Northwest College is affiliated with
Assemblies of God denomination); see also Kilpatrick, supra note 94, at 1 (mentioning
College's affiliation to Assemblies of God); Northwest College, About the College: History,
available at http://www.nwcollege.edu/about/history.html (last visited October 6, 2004)
(asserting College's founding by Northwest District Council of the Assemblies of God).
96 See Locke, 124 S. Ct. at 1310-11 (asserting that pastoral studies degree was clearly
devotional in nature and thus prohibited student from receiving scholarship funds under
Washington law); see also Kilpatrick, supra note 94, at 1 (emphasizing that Davey's major
in pastoral ministries was considered theology degree and that he was asked to choose
another major in order to keep his scholarship); Montoya, supra note 91, at 1161 (noting
Northwest College determined that Pastoral Ministry major is considered theology
degree).
97 See Locke, 124 S. Ct. at 1310-11 (noting that Davey enrolled for double major in
pastoral ministry and business management); Northwest College, Academic Catalog,
Business Management & Administration, Overview, available at http://www.nwcollege.
edu/catalog/programs/busadmaj.html (last visited October 6, 2004) (noting that even
majoring in business administration involves integration of study of business with
"Christian value system and perspective"). See generally KILPATRICK, supra note 94, at 1
(observing that Davey's double major in pastoral ministry and business administration
was finally considered theology degree by Supreme Court).
98 See Locke, 124 S. Ct. at 1311 (describing Davey's meeting with financial aid
director); see also Davey v. Locke, No. COO-61R, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22273, *1 (W.D.
Wash. October 5, 2000) (stating that school administrators announced to Davey his
disqualification from Promise Scholarship); MONTOYA, supra note 91, at 1161 (noting
school administrators announced to Davey that he was not eligible for his scholarship).
99 See Locke v. Davey, 124 S. Ct. 1307, 1311 (2004) (stating that Davey had to sign
forms stating he would not pursue theology degree); see also Davey, 2000 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 22273 at *1 (noting how school had to provide certification form that students did
not study for theology degrees in order to receive funds). See generally Kilpatrick, supra
note 94, at 1 (observing university forced Davey to choose between dropping his ministry
major or forfeiting his scholarship).
100 See Locke,124 S. Ct. at 1311 (noting that Davey did not sign said form and
continued at his university without receipt of scholarship funds); see also Axtell, supra
note 80, at 602 (stating that Davey continued at school even after his scholarship was
withdrawn); Kilpatrick, supra note 94, at 1 (observing that Davey continued studying
pastoral ministry without receiving scholarship).
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B. Procedural History
After the state's denial of aid, Davey filed an action in federal
district court101 against several state officials102 to enjoin them
from refusing to award the scholarship solely on the basis of the
pursuit of a degree in devotional theology, alleging violation of
his rights under the Free Exercise Clause.103 The District Court
for Western District of Washington denied Davey's motion for an
injunction and then granted summary judgment to
defendants.104 In doing so, the court specifically held that there
was no Free Exercise Clause violation because, while Davey had
a right to pursue the degree in pastoral studies, he had no right
to have the state of Washington fund that pursuit.105 Davey
101 See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2004) (allowing suit to be brought in federal court against
any individual who under law of any state subjects any United States citizen of
deprivation of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by Constitution); see also Locke,
124 S. Ct. at 1311 (noting that Davey brought suit in federal court in accordance to 42
U.S.C. § 1983). See generally Montoya, supra note 91, at 1161 (describing procedural
history).
102 See Locke, 124 S. Ct. at 1311 (noting that Davey brought suit against several state
officials); Davey, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22273, at 1*-*2 (noting how, specifically, Davey
sued Gary Locke, Governor of Washington, and three members of Higher Education
Coordinating Board of Washington: Marcus Gaspard, Executive Director; Bob Craves,
Chair; and John Klacik, Associate Director). See generally Montoya, supra note 93, at
1161 (describing procedural history).
103 See U.S. CONST. amend. I (enumerating how "Congress shall make no
law.. .prohibiting the free exercise [of religion]"); see also Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310
U.S. 296, 303 (1940) (holding Fourteenth Amendment rendered state legislatures as
incompetent as Congress to enact such laws respecting free exercise of religion); Locke,
124 S. Ct. at 1311 (noting how Davey also alleged Establishment Clause violations, as
well as violations of Constitution's Free Speech Clause and Equal Protection Clause). See
generally Davey, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22273, at *5, *11, *25 (affirming how Davey also
advanced arguments under Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause and under
Washington State Constitution's free exercise and free speech provisions).
104 See Davey, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22273, at *5 (explaining decision to grant
summary judgment to defendants was made after carefully reviewing case record and
pertinent authority and concluding that there was no genuine issue of material fact). See
generally Allied Mktg. Group, Inc. v. CDL Mktg., Inc., 878 F.2d 806, 809 (5th Cir. 1989)
(reiterating that injunctions can only be granted when moving party proves 4 factors: "(1)
substantial likelihood of success on the merits; (2) substantial threat that failure to grant
the injunction will result in irreparable injury; (3) that the threatened injury outweighs
any damage that the injunction may cause the opposing party; and (4) that the injunction
will not disserve the public interest"); Parente v. Univ. of Pa., No. 99-CV-2374, 2001 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 15855, at *2 (E.D. Pa. July 24, 2001) (affirming how under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 56, federal courts may grant summary judgment as matter of law if
movant shows no genuine issue of any material fact).
105 See Davey, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22273, at *12-*13 (noting how Supreme Court
pointed out key word in Free Exercise Clause is 'prohibit,' since its main objective is
defining what government is prohibited from doing to individual; Regan v. Taxation with
Representation, 461 U.S. 540, 549 (1983) (postulating how Supreme Court has held that
"a legislature's decision not to subsidize the exercise of a fundamental right does not
infringe the right"); Crow v. Gullet, 541 F. Supp. 785, 791 (D.S.D. 1982), affd, 706 F.2d
856 (8th Cir. 1983) (affirming how many lower courts have abided by standard that while
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appealed to the Ninth Circuit, who reversed the district court's
holding.106 The court concluded that the law lacked facial
neutrality and thus should be subject to strict scrutiny.107 In
applying strict scrutiny, the court found that the state's interest
in its constitutional provision preventing state funds from going
toward religious instruction was not compelling enough to
warrant the exclusion of students who make a personal decision
to major in theology.' 0 The dissenting judge felt that the
majority wrongly analyzed as a free exercise case what was
essentially a public funding case and agreed with the district
court that the state had no obligation to fund Davey's exercise of
his constitutional rights under the Free Exercise Clause.109
Free Exercise Clause prevents states from barring religious acts, it does not "provide the
means or the environment for carrying them out").
106 See Davey v. Locke, 299 F.3d 748, 750 (9th Cir. 2002), rev'd, 540 U.S. 712 (2004)
(holding that Higher Education Coordinating Board violated Davey's rights by not
awarding scholarship); see also Edelstein, supra note 20, at 175 (discussing how this
violation was due to Davey being denied his scholarship due to his desire to pursue
theology degree).
107 See Davey, 299 F.3d at 750-53 (debating how this law is not neutral toward
religion because scholarship is made generally available to all and then is specifically
denied to those who choose religious majors; furthermore, any law that "refer[s] on [its]
face to religion" lacks neutrality and implicates Free Exercise Clause, requiring strict
scrutiny); see also Edelstein, supra note 20, at 175 (discussing how court found law at
issue lacked neutrality because it 'unconstitutionally discriminated' based on religion).
108 See Davey, 299 F.3d at 759-60 (pointing out that Washington's constitution
ordered application of money to religious instruction and such Promise Scholarship did
not contain strict criteria for qualification that would prevent Davey from receiving said
scholarship; furthermore, specifically deeming state's interest not compelling enough in
this case because of intervening factor of recipient's individual choice of funds to
potentially spend them on religious education and because the state funds could be spent
on any number of educational expenses so that their being spent particularly on the
tuition for religious classes was tenuous); see also Green, supra note 82, at 654 (affirming
how, since state's interest was not compelling, court found this scholarship requirement
"facially discriminated against a class of students on the basis of religion" and "violated
the student's right to free exercise of religion").
109 See Davey, 299 F.3d at 761 (McKeown, CJ., dissenting) (defining issue as
"whether the State of Washington may constitutionally decline to fund pastoral studies as
part of its Promise Scholarship" because he believed this was one public funding case:
rather than prohibiting exercising activity, this Promise Scholarship revealed state's
willingness to select which activities it would fund); see also id. at 752 (countering her
second point by noting line of cases that distinguish between restrictions government puts
on funds based on whether government acts as 'a speaker' or not; furthermore,
government acts as 'a speaker' when it "selectively fund[s] a program to encourage
activities that it believes are in the public interest" and referring to Promise Scholarship
goals as 'broad,' majority felt that government was not acting as 'a speaker' here, thereby
requiring that scholarship administration be viewpoint neutral). Cf. Green, supra note 84,
at 655 (discussing how Davey court failed to adequately address conflicting precedent and
contradicted Court precedent in conditional funding cases).
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C. The Majority Opinion
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in the case to decide the
Free Exercise question and reversed the Ninth Circuit's
holding.110 Chief Justice Rehnquist, in his majority opinion,
noted that the tension that exists between the Free Exercise and
Establishment Clauses is somewhat counteracted by the Court's
precedent of recognizing a "play in the joints" between the two. 111
This means that there are some state actions that are neither
prohibited by the Establishment Clause nor required by the Free
Exercise Clause.112 The Court held that this case fell in this
space between the two Constitutional religion clauses, 113 and
framed the issue as "whether Washington could, pursuant with
its own constitution, which has been authoritatively interpreted
as prohibiting even indirectly funding religious instruction that
will prepare students for the ministry, can deny them such
funding without violating the Free Exercise Clause."114 The
Court distinguished this case from the line of cases requiring
facial neutrality, holding that instead of forcing students to
choose between receiving a government benefit and following his
110 See Locke v. Davey, 124 S. Ct. 1307, 1311 (2004) (reiterating Ninth Circuit's
holding and stating reversal).
111 See Locke, 124 S. Ct. at 1311 (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n of N.Y., 397 U.S. 664,
669 (1970)) (discussing First Amendment protections and pointing out that two
guarantees are often in conflict); see also Walz, 397 U.S. at 669 (noting "we will not
tolerate either governmentally established religion or governmental interference with
religion .... there is room for play in the joints.. .which will permit religious exercise to
exist without sponsorship").
112 See Locke, 124 S. Ct. at 1311 (asserting that this "play in the joints" permits but
does not require certain state actions); see also Michael W. McConnell, Accommodation of
Religion: An Update and Response to the Critics, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 685, 687-88
(1992) (stating that "[t]he Supreme Court's current position is that accommodations are
not required under the Free Exercise Clause (with minor exceptions), but are permissible
under the Establishment Clause"); Green, supra note 82, at 658 (reiterating that "Free
Exercise Clause does not require state action simply because it is permitted under the
Establishment Clause").
113 See Locke, 124 S. Ct. at 1311 (specifying state action of giving scholarships to
those who want to pursue degrees in theology would not violate Establishment Clause
under Court's most recent formulations of requirements); see also Zelman v. Simmons-
Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 652 (2002) (reaffirming no Establishment Clause violation where
government money goes to religious school due to recipient's "genuine and independent
private choice"); Witters v. Wash. Dep't. of Servs. for Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 489 (1986)
(holding no Establishment clause violation in situation factually similar to Locke).
114 Locke, 124 S. Ct. at 1312 (citations omitted) (concluding that "play in the joints" in
the federal Constitution allowed Washington to authorize Promise Scholars to obtain
theology degrees; however, this court was faced with whether Washington's state
constitution would prohibit same).
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religious beliefs, "[t]he state has merely chosen to fund a distinct
category of instruction." 115
The Court then notes the particularity of religious professions,
observing that it is not all that strange that states would treat
funding them or the education leading up to them differently
than other professions because of the unique treatment that
religion has received both by the federal and state constitutions.
Because of this, the state has not shown "hostility toward
religion."116 In fact, the Court notes that the Washington
program is actually quite inclusive of religion.11 7 Specifically, the
state allows students to attend "pervasively religious schools,"
like Northwest College, using the Promise Scholarship.118
Students can also use the scholarship to take devotional theology
courses at these schools, so long as they do not major in it.119
Along the same lines, the Court also highlights the importance of
antiestablishment concerns, especially when it comes to taxpayer
funds to support the clergy, a sentiment which dates back to the
founding of the country.120 Once again emphasizing the lack of
115 Locke v. Davey, 124 S. Ct. 1307, 1312-13 (2004) (articulating "th[is] State's
disfavor of religion (if it can be called that) is of a far milder kind. It imposes neither
criminal nor civil sanctions on any type of religious service or rite").
116 Id. at 1313 (discussing treatment of religion as profession); see Perry v. Sch. Dist.,
54 Wn.2d 886, 897 (Wash., 1959) (specifying that unique view of state and federal
constitutions towards religion favors freedom and opposes establishment; furthermore,
Supreme Court of Washington specifically stated that it was never intended for its state
constitution to be construed in any manner that would indicate hostility towards religion).
See generally Kyle Duncan, Secularism's Laws: State Blaine Amendments and Religious
Persecution, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 493, 515, 519 n.116 (2003) (defining state Blaine
Amendments broadly to include provision at issue in Davey).
117 See Locke, 124 S. Ct. at 1314 (noting Promise Scholarships actually includes
religion in its benefits); see also Perry, 54 Wn.2d at 897 (stating Washington's constitution
recognizes religion's important influence in all human affairs essential to community's
well-being).
118 See Locke, 124 S. Ct. at 1315 (highlighting that Washington program is inclusive
of pervasively religious schools provided they are accredited; additionally, pointing out
that Washington takes special measures to ensure its constitution protects religion).
119 See Locke, 124 S. Ct. at 1315 n.9 (proposing many students are in fact required to
take some religious classes, and extrapolating that it is still an open question whether
state constitutions would allow funds to be used toward devotional theology courses for
undeclared majors, but that under current Washington state law, such use is
permissible); see also Witters v. Dep't of Services for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 489 (1986)
(upholding state funding to student attending private university with religious
affiliations); State ex rel. Gallwey v. Grimm, 146 Wn.2d 445, 470-71 (Wash, 2002)
(affirming use of state funds by parochial school student pursuing religious education in
preparation for career as pastor, missionary, or youth director).
120 See Locke v. Davey, 124 S. Ct. 1307, 1314 (2004) (clarifying that many state
constitutions "explicitly exclude[e] only the ministry from receiving state dollars"); see
also Ga. CONST. art. IV, § 5 (1789), 2 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL
CHARTERS AND OTHER ORGANIc LAWS 789 (F. Thorpe ed., 1909) (stating , "all persons
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animus toward religion in either the history or application of the
state constitutional provision, the majority holds that the
provision is not "inherently constitutionally suspect" and given
the relatively small burden placed on Davey121 and the great
state interest previously endorsed by the Court, they felt that
"Davey's claim must fail."122 The Court concludes by stating "[i]f
any room exists between the two Religion Clauses, it must be
here"123 and declining to "venture further into this difficult
area." 124
D. The Dissenting Opinion
Justice Scalia wrote the primary dissent in the case 125 in which
he states his belief that the law should have been subject to strict
scrutiny and that it would have failed such analysis because the
state "facially discriminates against religion."126 He argues that
"[w]hen the state makes a public benefit generally available...
[and then] withholds that benefit from some individuals solely on
shall have the free exercise of religion, without being obliged to contribute to the support
of any religious profession but their own"); Pa. CONST. art. 11 (1776), 5 FEDERAL AND
STATE CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS 3082 (F. Thorpe
ed., 1909) (declaring "no man ought or of right can be compelled to attend any religious
worship, or erect or support any place of worship or maintain any ministry, contrary to, or
against, his own free will and consent").
121 See Locke, 124 S. Ct. at 1315 (asserting exclusion of funding vocational degrees as
one minor burden on all Promise Scholars); see also Brief for Petitioner at 24, Locke v.
Davey, 124 S. Ct. 1307 (2004) (No. 02-1315) (noting burden on those who want to pursue
theology degree comes in different forms, neither of which prevents students from
pursuing said degree, and in theory, one student could attend two different institutions,
using his Promise Scholarship at one school to get his secular degree and use his own
funds to pursue his religious degree somewhere else; in fact, Davey himself was able to
pursue said degree, even without this scholarship, by working extra hours each week,
though this argument was made in the free speech and association context); Joseph P.
Viteritti, Davey's Plea: Blaine, Blair, Witters, and the Protection of Religious Freedom, 27
HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 299, 336 (2003) (clarifying that discrimination based on religion
was Davey's burden).
122 Locke, 124 S. Ct. at 1315 (affirming fate of Davey's argument).
123 Id.
124 Id.
125 See Locke v. Davey, 124 S. Ct. 1307, 1316 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (asserting
immediately that Court's decision is inconsistent with previous cases); see also id. at
1320-21 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (joining Scalia's dissent with his own definition, in his
questioning statute's meaning of 'theology,' even though parties did not contest it, it
meant degrees that were devotional in nature); Katherine M. Sullivan, Justice Scalia and
the Religion Clauses, 22 HAWAII L. REV. 449, 449-50 (2000) (noting how, generally, Scalia
is reluctant to state that modern legislation establishes religion). See generally Lee v.
Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 631-46 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that official prayer
at public school graduation did not constitute establishment of religion).
126 Locke, 124 S. Ct. at 1316 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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the basis of religion, it violates the Free Exercise Clause."'127 He
then decries the Court's reliance on the "play in the joints"
principle as a "refusal to apply any principle when faced with
competing constitutional directives."128 At the very least, he feels
that this standard should only apply where there is a "close call
whether complying with one of the Religion Clauses would
violate the other one." 129 Here, that analysis is not close, since
giving aid to Davey would not violate the Establishment
Clause.130 He argues a better approach would be for the state to
institute some other non-discriminatory means of preventing aid
from going to those who plan to pursue careers in the clergy
without violating the Free Exercise Clause.131 He criticizes the
Court's lack of explanation concerning the standard of review to
be applied and says that the state's interest here is not
compelling enough to survive the strict scrutiny that he feels is
appropriate.132
127 Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting) The dissent distinguished situation in Locke from those
where plaintiff asks for "a special benefit to which others are not entitled," noting that
Davey "seeks only equal treatment-the right to direct his scholarship to his chosen
course of study, a right every other Promise Scholar enjoys." Id. Further, Scalia rejected
majority's conclusions regarding founders' fears about taxpayer dollars going to clergy
members, noting that those fears were aimed not at excluding ministers from generally
available benefits but to prevent them from being singled out for special aid. In a similar
vein, he challenges majority's insistence that state constitutional provisions prohibiting
taxpayer support for clergy were meant to exclude clergy from receiving generally
available benefits.
128 Id. at 1317 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
129 Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
130 See Locke, 124 S. Ct. at 1317 (Scalia, J. dissenting) (noting unanimity of decision
in Witters v. Washington Department of Services for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986), a case
almost factually identical to Locke); see also Martha McCarthy, The Law in Providing
Education: Religious Influences in Public Schools: The Winding Path Toward
Accommodation, 23 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REV. 565, 596 n.14 (2004) (purporting
scholarship for pastoral studies would not abridge Establishment Clause). See generally
Sullivan, supra note 125, at 449 (commenting on Scalia's hesitancy in defining modern
laws as establishments of religion).
131 See Locke v. Davey, 124 S. Ct. 1307, 1317 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(suggesting two such proposed methods: only allowing scholarships to be used at state
universities or allowing use for limited set of courses of study only); see also Richard C.
Schragger, The Role of the Local in the Doctrine and Discourse of Religious Liberty, 117
HARV. L. REV. 1810, 1860 (2004) (noting that, during oral argument, Scalia 'energetically'
expressed his view that states must not make distinctions between religiously and
nonreligiously motivated conduct, belief, or action). See generally Sullivan, supra note
125, at 449 (emphasizing how Scalia generally disfavors free exercise and establishment
clause enforcement by judiciary).
132 See Locke, 124 S. Ct. at 1318 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (rejecting Washington's
contention that state's interest is protecting taxpayer dollars from supporting religion,
noting de minimis impact on any individual citizen's taxes, and asserting his belief that
Washington's true interest is discrimination against those wishing to pursue ministry
careers); see also Schragger, supra note 131, at 1860 (describing Scalia's dissent as
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He takes exception with the Court's attempts to distinguish
Washington's constitution from other non-neutral laws. He first
notes that the burden on Davey is light, which has little weight
when analyzing a law that is not neutral.133 He also disputes
that the legislature's lack of animus toward religion or religious
belief matters and believes that "[i]t is sufficient that the citizen's
rights have been infringed."134 He then cautions that, while the
Court's decision here might be limited to the clergy context, "its
logic is readily extendable."135 Next time, because of the decision
in this case, Scalia believes the Court will be "less well
equipped"136 to deal with more invidious forms of discrimination.
IV. ANALYSIS
A. The Court Should Have Applied Strict Scrutiny
Using the standards the Court set forth in Smith and
expounded upon in Lukumi, Washington's Promise Scholarship is
not a neutral law of general applicability.137 The law in Locke is
'pushing' Court to broaden Religion Clauses' antidiscrimination principle to encompass
discrimination between religion and nonreligion). See generally Moens, supra note 73, at
557 (emphasizing Scalia's view that when Religion Clauses demand neutrality, they must
be enforced).
133 See Locke, 124 S. Ct. at 1318 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting "[t]he indignity of
being signaled out for special burdens on the basis of one's religious calling is so profound
that the concrete harm produced can never be dismissed as substantial" and emphasizing
that "[t]he Court has not required proof of 'substantial' concrete harm with other forms of
discrimination"). See generally Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954)
(maintaining that where states have undertaken to provide educational opportunities,
those opportunities must be made available to all on equal terms); Viteritti, supra note
121, at 336 (describing Davey's burden as being discriminated against on basis of
religion).
134 Locke, 124 S. Ct. at 1319 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (linking both this argument and
previous one with Court's precedent in decisions involving gender discrimination, tying
animus point to precedent involving gender discrimination, and discussing Court
precedent regarding religious discrimination (citing McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 621
(1978) (plurality opinion) (striking down Tennessee law prohibiting clergy members from
sitting in state legislature)).
135 Locke v. Davey, 124 S. Ct. 1307, 1319 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
136 Id. at 1320 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
137 Compare Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 533
(1993) (holding "the minimum requirement of neutrality is that a law not discriminate on
its face"), with Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878 (1988) (requiring state laws
to be 'generally applicable' with only 'incidental effect' on free exercise to pass
constitutional muster). See generally Stuart J. Lark, Religious Expression, Government
Funds, and the First Amendment, 105 W. VA. L. REV. 317, 339 (2003) (reiterating Ninth
Circuit's position that state laws that exclude others on basis of religion are not neutral);
Moens, supra note 73, at 557 (describing Scalia's view that when states withhold public
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incredibly dissimilar from that at issue in Smith. Smith involved
an appeal for an exemption from the state of Oregon's penal law
prohibiting possession and use of controlled substances.138
Regardless of whether critics feel Smith was properly decided, 139
it is a far cry from Locke, where a student was merely seeking to
be treated equally in his choice of a major to everyone else in the
state, a choice that was based on his religious convictions. 140
Both cases factually involve claimants taking an action based on
their religious beliefs.
While the Court takes pains to distinguish the facts of Lukumi
and Locke,141 if anything, Locke is an easier Free Exercise
question because the law at issue therein refers directly to a
religious practice protected by the First Amendment and then
singles it out for different treatment. 142 The reference to religious
practice in the statute, coupled with the different treatment
benefits from some individuals solely on basis of religion, such benefit is not generally
available and states violate Constitution's Free Exercise Clause).
138 See Smith, 494 U.S. at 874 (explaining that respondents were fired from their jobs
with private drug rehabilitation organization for ingesting peyote for sacramental
purposes during religious ceremonies and were later denied unemployment compensation
because they had been discharged for work related 'misconduct'); see also Boerne v.
Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 513 (1997) (emphasizing that Oregon statute in Smith was enacted
to prohibit socially harmful conduct); Black v. Employment Div., 75 Ore. App. 735, 737
(Or. App. 1985) (adding respondent Black had history of substance abuse).
139 See, e.g., Lupu, Employment Division, supra note 41, at 260 (arguing that Smith
is "substantially wrong and institutionally irresponsible"); McConnell, supra note 41, at
1111 (challenging Smith decision's use of legal sources and its theoretical argument);
Marin, supra note 41, at 1434 (criticizing Court's decision in Smith as unjustified
departure from established free exercise precedent).
140 See Locke v. Davey, 124 S. Ct. 1307, 1310-22 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(declaring Davey met every Promise Scholarship requirement; however, he was denied
funds because he chose to pursue his devotional theology degree); McDaniel v. Paty, 435
U.S. 618, 626 (1978) (plurality opinion) (suggesting Free Exercise Clause 'unquestionably'
protects the right to be a minister, and presumably the right to choose a course of study to
prepare oneself for that calling); see also Robert William Gall, The Past Should Not
Shackle the Present: The Revival of a Legacy of Religious Bigotry by Opponents of School
Choice, 59 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 413, 431 (2003) (noting, while holding in Davey's
favor, that state government is not required to subsidize exercise of fundamental rights,
such as the right to education; however, it cannot discriminate against such exercise of
that right when it funds general welfare programs).
141 See Locke, 124 S. Ct. at 1312 (noting "state's disfavor of religion... is of a far
milder kind" in Locke than in Lukumi); see also Moens, supra note 73, at 556 (examining
how Supreme Court attempted to distinguish Locke facts); Montoya, supra note 91, at
1165 (stating facts of Locke are distinguishable from facts of Lukumi).
142 Compare Locke, 124 S. Ct. at 1310 (excluding those who pursue theology degree)
with Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 527 (defining 'sacrifice' banned by city ordinance consonant
with but not exclusively related to religion). See generally Moens, supra note 73, at 555
(noting that Supreme Court examines how statute in question treats religion when
determining constitutionality of statute); Schragger, supra at note 131, at 1862 (finding
that singling out religion is controlling when determining statute's constitutionality).
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afforded to those engaged in that religious practice, should be
enough to trigger strict scrutiny under Lukumi, even absent an
ill motive by the state, and despite the state's interest in setting
up a stricter separation of church and state than the Federal
Establishment Clause provides.
If the Court had applied strict scrutiny, 143 Washington's
exclusion of devotional theology majors from receiving
scholarship funds would have failed. It is unlikely that any
state's greater establishment protections could ever justify such a
Free Exercise Clause violation,144 which was the state interest
asserted by Washington in Locke.145 However, even if one
concedes that this would be a legitimate interest, it is not
narrowly tailored; as Justice Scalia points out in his dissent,
there are a number of ways the state could have complied with
its stricter separation between church and state and at the same
time not implicated the Free Exercise Clause.146
143 See Andrew A. Beerworth, Religion in the Marketplace: Establishments,
Pluralisms, and the Doctrinal Eclipse of Free Exercise, 26 SAN DIEGO JUST. J. 333 (2004)
(discussing Court's decision in Locke and standards used to evaluate said case). Cf. Craig
v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (holding "classifications by gender must serve
important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of
those objectives") with Locke, 124 S. Ct. at 1315 (referring to state interest as substantial;
the Supreme Court never announces which standard it applies, though it does use
language reminiscent of so-called intermediate scrutiny in Equal Protection cases
involving gender).
144 See Locke, 124 S. Ct. at 1315 (noting certain areas of state action where
Establishment Clause will not be violated but Free Exercise Clause does not require state
to act); see also Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 883-84 (1990) (discussing
'compelling' level of state interest needed to require individuals to fulfill civic obligations
when they conflict with religious beliefs); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 276 (1981)
(observing "state interest ... in achieving greater separation of church and State.. .is
limited by the Free Exercise Clause").
145 See Locke v. Davey, 124 S. Ct. 1307, 1315 (2004) (noting Washington's argument
that state interests in this case was avoiding violations of Establishment Clause).
146 See Locke, 124 S. Ct. at 1317 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (articulating ways state could
have had 'play in the joints' while still complying with Free Exercise Clause); see also
Tony Mauro, Supreme Court Debates Religion Case; Justices Show Concern over Fallout
from Challenge to Washington State Ban on Theology Scholarships, LEGAL TIMES, Dec. 8,
2003, at 10 (noting petitioner's argument that state avoided drawing line any other way
because of entanglement issues). Cf. WASH. CONST. Art. I, § 11 (requiring no public money
to be directed toward religious instruction) with WASH. REV. CODE § 28B.10.814 (2004)
(prohibiting only use of state aid for those majoring in theology; such law could also be
said to be not narrowly tailored because it does not, in effect, achieve state's purported
goal).
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B. Religion Clauses Should Be Read Together to Require
Neutrality
Both religion clauses were originally included in the First
Amendment to protect religious liberty.147 The Free Exercise
clause was meant to protect individuals from governmental
interference with their religious practices.148 The Establishment
Clause, by prohibiting government from setting up a state
religion or showing a preference for one religion over another,
was likewise meant to protect citizens from indirect intimidation
to alter their religious beliefs.149
While the two clauses were originally intended to work
together, the Supreme Court has muddied the waters by creating
a confusing jurisprudence between the two clauses; this has
caused the two clauses to frequently come into tension with one
another.150  For example, many state laws that provide
accommodations to religion or exemptions based on religious
belief could arguably be described as advancing religion, which
would make them unconstitutional establishments of religion
147 See Bd. of Educ. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 690 (1994) (emphasizing that religion
clauses all advance notion that "one's religion ought not affect one's legal rights or duties
or benefits"); see also Michael Stokes Paulsen, Religion and the Public Schools After Lee v.
Weisman: Lemon is Dead, 43 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 795, 798 (1993) (noting that both
religion clauses protect liberty from different angles); Lynne A. Rafalowski, Note, Can
Public Schools Really Permit Religious Speech without Promoting Religion? The Struggle
to Accommodate but Not Establish Religion in Chandler v. James, 45 VILL. L. REV. 547,
548 (2000) (arguing that "religion clauses of the First Amendment were meant to work
together to protect religious freedom").
148 See John Gay, Bowen v. Kendrick: Establishing a New Relationship Between
Church and State, 38 AM. U. L. REV. 953, 992 n.2 (1989) (arguing that purpose of both
Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses is to secure religious liberty); Wendell J. Sherk,
Putting the Fear of God into Bankruptcy Creditors, 7 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 625, 631
n.17 (1999) (noting purpose of Free Exercise Clause is to protect religion from
governmental interference); Rafalowski, supra note 147, at 547-48 (describing goals of
Free Exercise Clause).
149 See Gay, supra note 148, at 992 (arguing that purpose of Free Exercise and
Establishment Clauses is to secure religious liberty); Rafalowski, supra note 147, at 548
(noting that "governmental establishment would hinder rather than protect religious
freedom"); Rezai, supra note 14, at 540 n.35 (citing West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette,
319 U.S. 624, 634-36 (1943) (stating purpose of Establishment clause is to protect
religious liberties from majorities).
150 See Jay Alan Sekulow, et al, How Much God in the Schools?: Religious Freedom
and the First Self-Evident Truth: Equality As a Guiding Principle in Interpreting the
Religion Clauses, 4 WM. & MARY BILL OF RTS. J. 351, 360 (1995) (arguing that Supreme
Court's Lemon decision actually exacerbates tension between these two clauses); see also
Roberto L. Corrada, Religious Accommodation and the National Labor Relations Act, 17
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L 185, 253 (1996) (noting how Justice Stewart has commented
on such tension in his decisions); Rezai, supra note 14, at 504 (discussing confusion and
erratic interpretation of Establishment clause due to Court's Free Exercise Clause
decisions).
20051 THE DEATH OF NEUTRALITY
under the Lemon test.151 The fact that Lemon, in requiring that a
state not advance religion, and Sherbert, in requiring the states
to create exemptions to laws of general applicability for religious
practice, co-existed for a time as definitive statements from the
Court did little to help the confusion.152 The Court has tried to
correct this in a number of ways. 153 Most recently, it seemed the
Court had settled on a system of neutrality with regard to both
clauses, 154 allowing them to work more harmoniously together.155
But the Court in Locke has signaled a retreat from this wise
direction by rejecting the "claim of presumptive
unconstitutionality"'156 for at least some laws that discriminate
151 See Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 586 (1987) (holding state is required to
articulate 'a secular purpose' in order to maintain law's validity); Janna C. Merrick,
Spiritual Healing, Sick Kids, and the Law: Inequities in the American Healthcare System,
29 AM. J. L. & MED. 269, 286 (2003) (noting that Lemon test requires secular legislative
intent behind a law); Sekulow, supra note 150, at 360 (discussing Court's application of
Lemon test).
152 See Stanley H. Friedelbaum, Free Exercise in the States: Belief, Conduct, and
Judicial Benchmarks, 63 ALB. L. REV. 1059, 1064 (2000) (discussing how Sherbert line of
cases has been relegated to dealing with unemployment compensation); Patty
Gerstenblith, Civil Court Resolution of Property Disputes Among Religious Organization,
39 AM. U. L. REV 513, 572 n.5 (1990) (citing both Sherbert and Lemon as tests for
determining whether statutes are constitutional); see also Gabriel A. Moens, Church and
State Relations in Australia and the United States: The Purpose and Effect Approaches
and the Neutrality Principle, 1996 BYU L. REV. 787, 807 (1996) (noting Court's move away
from Sherbert test).
153 See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 670-73 (1984) (stating that, while Court has
held purpose of Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses to keep church and the state
from interfering with each other, total separation is not possible); Walz v. Tax Comm'n of
N.Y., 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970) (noting that "[t]he Court has struggled to find a neutral
course between the two Religion Clauses"); see also Tyll van Geel, Shaping Each Other
and the Next Century: Citizenship Education and the Free Exercise of Religion, 34 AKRON
L. REV. 293, 307 (2000) (finding that neutrality of legislation is not necessarily
determinative of its constitutionality).
154 See Michael W. McConnell, Religious Participation in Public Programs: Religious
Freedom at a Crossroads, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 115, 166 (1992) (stating most logical
interpretation at that time "would be to read both clauses as embodying a formal
neutrality toward religion"). Cf. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508
U.S. 520, 533-34 (1993) (highlighting importance of neutrality in complying with Free
Exercise Clause) with Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 653-54 (2002)
(emphasizing neutrality as focus of Establishment Clause inquiry).
155 See Esbeck, supra note 66, at 894 (advocating neutrality to alleviate tension
between these two clauses); Michael W. McConnell & Richard A. Posner, An Economic
Approach to Issues of Religious Freedom, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 34 (1989) (opining that
these two clauses "are best interpreted from the standpoint of neutrality. Together they
reconcile the broad governmental authority of the modern welfare-regulatory state with
the preservation of private choice-a free market-in religion"); Rezai, supra note 14, at
505-06 (recognizing suggestion that "the principle of clear neutrality... provides the most
appropriate doctrinal framework to preserve harmony between the religion clauses").
156 Locke v. Davey, 124 S. Ct. 1307, 1312 (2004); see Moens, supra note 73, at 535
(noting Locke holding is "incompatible with the free choice line of cases exemplified in
Zelman, according to which the neutrality principle is violated if a governmental program
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on the basis of religion, even while acknowledging that the law is
not neutral with respect to religion.157
Neutrality should be the goal of the Religion Clauses, and it
should be with an eye toward this end that the Court reviews
laws for potential Constitutional violations. This approach
largely comports with much current Supreme Court
jurisprudence.158 The Court's most recent statements on the
Establishment Clause indicate that neutral laws (laws that make
money generally available on a non-religious basis to individuals
who then choose to spend it consonant with their religious
beliefs) are perfectly valid under the Constitution.159 Likewise,
the Court has interpreted the Free Exercise Clause to require
states not to single out religion or religious practice for disfavor
while not requiring them to provide religious exemptions from
neutral laws of general applicability.160
The neutrality standard is somewhat complicated by the fact
that it does not always require the government to refrain from
adversely impacts sectarianism and elevates secularism"); Montoya, supra note 91, at
1173 (stating that Locke Court "effectively limited" neutrality principle's application).
157 See Locke, 124 S. Ct. at 1312 (declining to extend Lukumi rule to this situation
despite argument that law at issue "is not facially neutral with respect to religion); see
also id. at 1318 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting "[t]he Court makes no serious attempt to
defend the program's neutrality"); Montoya, supra note 91, at 1174 (indicating that Locke
Court decided "not to apply strict scrutiny to a non-neutral law").
158 See Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 114 (2001) (recognizing
neutrality as one central theme in several Supreme Court holdings); Epperson v.
Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 103-04 (1968) (recognizing that "[g]overnment in our democracy,
state and national, must be neutral in matters of religious theory, doctrine, and practice.
It may not be hostile to any religion or to the advocacy of non-religion; and it may not aid,
foster, or promote one religion or religious theory against another"); see also Rosenberger
v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 839 (1995) (declaring "a significant
factor in upholding governmental programs in the face of Establishment Clause attack is
their neutrality towards religion").
159 See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 653 (2002) (upholding state
program due to its neutrality); see also Witters v. Wash. Dep't of Services for Blind, 474
U.S. 481, 490-91 (1986) (Powell, J., concurring) (stating that wholly neutral state
programs do not violate constitutionality test); John T. Valauri, The Concept of Neutrality
in Establishment Clause Doctrine, 48 U. PITT. L. REV. 83, 101 (1986) (noting that
governmental aid programs that give money to religious groups are categorized under
notion of aiding all parties equally, despite incidental benefit to religion).
160 See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 537-38
(1993) (holding that devaluing religious justifications by judging them to be of lesser
import than nonreligious justifications amounts to singling out of religious practice for
discriminatory treatment); see also Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 884 (1990)
(recognizing exemptions cannot be withheld from religious hardship cases without
compelling reason); Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 708 (1986) (declaring "refusal to extend
an exemption to an instance of religious hardship suggests a discriminatory intent").
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taking a position with respect to religion. 161 The Court has, and
should, allow states to recognize religious beliefs if they choose to
do so, without violating the Establishment Clause.162 This might
seem at first to give greater weight to the Free Exercise Clause
than the Establishment Clause, which thereby ruins the strict
neutrality standard; however, there is a distinction between
recognizing that people have religious beliefs and act in
accordance with them, and encouraging them to do so. 163 It still
comports with neutrality because the state is merely
acknowledging that sometimes religious beliefs might come in
conflict with the laws of the state and choosing not to punish or
burden the choice a person makes between acting in accord with
deeply held beliefs and acting in accord with the laws of the
state. 164 It would be beyond the realm of neutrality if a state
somehow expresses a preference for the choice of the religious
belief.165 Likewise, states should not be able to burden the
161 See Smith, 494 U.S. at 890 (declaring "a society that believes in the negative
protection accorded to religious belief can be expected to be solicitous of that value in its
legislation as well"); see also Rouser v. White, 944 F. Supp. 1447, 1452 (E.D. Cal. 1996)
(suggesting that Smith "implicitly approved of statutes according greater protection to the
exercise of religion than it was willing to recognize under the First Amendment"); Emily
Kawashima, Note, Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah: Reaffirming
the Supreme Court's Religious Free Exercise Jurisprudence, 16 HAWAII L. REV. 401, 439
(1994) (recognizing neutrality standard's 'complicated structure').
162 See Smith, 494 U.S. at 890 (stating that legislation can seek to statutorily protect
religious beliefs); Murphy v. Zoning Comm., 289 F. Supp. 2d 87, 121 n.35 (D. Conn. 2003)
(suggesting that Smith "implicitly endorsed a statute.., that protects somewhat 'more'
religious exercise than the Free Exercise Clause itself protects"); Wagering on Religious
Liberty, 116 HARV. L. REV. 946, 953 (2003) (describing legislature' ability to "carve out
protection for religiously motivated conduct if they wish").
163 See Kimberly M. DeShano, Educational Vouchers and the Religion Clauses Under
Agostini: Resurrection, Insurrection and a New Direction, 49 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
747, 796 (1999) (describing effect of Court's recent decisions as giving greater weight to
free exercise principles). Cf. Marianne E. Kreisher, Note, Religion: The Cognizable
Difference in Peremptory Challenges, 5 WIDENER J. PUB. L. 131, 165 n.215 (1995) (noting
that Smith Court recognized that one individual's religious beliefs are essential to that
person and must be given highest protection) with Christopher J. Heinze, Note, Illegal
Procedure: Student Delivered Prayer at Public High School Football Games, 23 HAMLINE
L. REV. 427, 443 (2000) (stating that government cannot encourage religious behavior).
164 See Michael W. McConnell, supra note 112, at 686 (describing "difference between
legitimate accommodation and impermissible 'establishment" as one distinction between
individual choice "independent of the government's action" and creating "an incentive or
inducement"). See generally Craig Anthony Arnold, Religious Freedom as a Civil Rights
Struggle, 2 NEXUS J. OP. 149, 151 (1997) (acknowledging growing number of conflicts
between regulation and religious belief); Thomas C. Berg, The Constitutional Future of
Religious Freedom Legislation, 20 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 715, 720 (1998) (describing
changing landscape that has seen such dramatic increases in relative frequency of
conflicts between religious duties and general laws since drafting of federal Constitution).
165 See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 650 (2002) (describing Court's
historical policy of considering whether state law 'deliberately skewed' incentives towards
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religious choice with laws that create incentives to choose against
religion instead of for it, for again neutrality would again be
sacrificed as the state expresses a preference for one over the
other. 166
C. Limitations on the Applicability of Neutrality Standard
This neutrality standard should apply to all cases involving the
Religion Clauses, but its greatest impact will be in the area of
educational funding, and this is as it should be. Education, while
not a fundamental right, has been afforded some special
significance not extended to other areas of government
funding.167 Furthermore, the Court has recognized a
fundamental right for parents to educate their children in
whatever manner they see fit.168 An example of this can be seen
by looking at one of the alternate ways articulated in the
dissenting opinion: the state could have avoided strict scrutiny by
allowing the scholarship to be used only at state schools. 169 The
religious institutions in determining whether said law comported with neutrality
principle); see also Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 399 (1983) (analyzing whether laws
would suggest state approval of any religion in determining law's validity); Widmar v.
Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 274 (1981) (indicating that there should be no "imprimatur of state
approval" of religion in state law).
166 See McConnell, supra note 112, at 689 (stating that formal neutrality requires
that states not "single out religion for burdensome treatment not visited upon other
interests"). See generally Alan E. Brownstein, Interpreting the Religion Clauses in Terms
of Liberty, Equality, and Free Speech Values, 13 ND J. L. ETHICS & PUB POLY 243, 246
(1999) (explaining goal of neutrality as to minimize "government's influence over personal
choices relating to religious beliefs and practices"); Russell L. Weaver, Like a Ghoul in a
Late Night Horror Movie, 41 BRANDEIS L.J. 587, 587 (2003) (commenting that government
cannot compel belief or disbelief in any religion).
167 See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221 (1982) (describing education as more
important than "other forms of social welfare legislation"); see also Meyer v. Nebraska,
262 U.S. 390, 400 (1923) (stating "American people have always regarded education and
acquisition of knowledge as matters of supreme importance which should be diligently
promoted). See generally Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 849 (1982) (noting how our
"Court has repeatedly recognized the unique role that education plays in American
society").
168 See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 60 (2000) (stating "the interest of parents in
the care, custody, and control of their children-is perhaps the oldest of the fundamental
liberty interests recognized by [the] Court"); see also Meyer, 262 U.S. at 401(holding state
statutes that restricted education in certain languages interfered "with the power of
parents to control the education of their own"); Cf. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S.
510, 534-35 (1925) (striking down law requiring elementary age students to attend public
school on basis of Meyer).
169 See Locke v. Davey, 124 S. Ct. 1307, 1318 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (finding
that "[tihere are any number of ways [Washington] could respect both its unusually
sensitive concern for the conscience of its taxpayers and the Federal Free Exercise Clause.
It could make the scholarships redeemable only at public universities"). See generally
Richard M. Paul III & Derek Rose, The Clash Between the First Amendment and Student
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state has the right to set the curriculum at the schools it has
created, and structuring the program in this way would allow the
state to effectively bar its funds from going to religious
instruction - while at the same time complying with the
neutrality required by the Constitution.170 When the state sets
the curriculum at the schools it funds, it makes a statement
about the types of education that are desirable and which are
not. 171 When it sets up a program to disburse funds directly to
students to spend on whatever educational expenses and choices
they see fit, it relinquishes control of the choice of what to spend
the money on, and should not be able to discriminate against
religious choice while allowing every other motivation. This
individual choice thus becomes imperative to neutrality, just as it
was in Zelman.172
It is important to single out situations where the government
acts as a speaker, because this applies another limit to the
neutrality standard. There, the Court has carved out the ability
for the government to decline to fund activity protected by the
Rights: Public University Nondiscrimination Clauses, 60 Mo. L. REV. 889, 915 (1995)
(stating "[t]he separation of church and state protected by the Establishment Clause...
prevents public universities from favoring one religious group over another").
170 See Locke, 124 S. Ct. at 1317 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that state has
authority to set curriculum for its schools); see also Epperson, 393 U.S. at 104 (stating
"[bly and large, public education in our Nation is committed to the control of state and
local authorities"). But see Matthew D. Donovan, Religion, Neutrality and the Public
School Curriculum: Equal Treatment Or Separation, 43 CATH. LAW. 187, 205 (2004)
(highlighting "[p]ublic school curricula across the nation have been challenged because, as
the Court has suggested, the secular can be hostile to religion. These challenges, however,
have not faired well").
171 See Molly O'Brien, Symposium: Education and the Constitution: Shaping Each
Other and the Next Century: Free at Last? Charter Schools and the "Deregulated"
Curriculum, 34 AKRON L. REV. 137, 150 (2000) (stating curriculum reflects value choices
because beginning point for planning curriculum is to decide what educational purposes
schools should pursue); see also Lee Pray, What Are the Limits to a School Board's
Authority to Remove Books From School Library Shelves-Pico v. Board of Education,
Island Trees Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 26, 1982 Wis. L. REV. 417, 468 (1982) (highlighting
that state generally chooses curricula reflective of community's political and social views).
See generally Paul, supra note 169, at 915 (stating that education is primary part of
government's role in preparing citizens to function in democratic society and be self-
sufficient in life).
172 See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 649 (2002) (upholding distinction
between direct government aid to religious schools and aid to individuals who then choose
to spend money on religious education); see also Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 810
(2000) (stating "[p]rivate choice... helps guarantee neutrality by mitigating the
preference for pre-existing recipients that is arguably inherent in any governmental aid
program"); Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 226 (1997) (holding that neutrality is
maintained when students use state vocational grants toward religious endeavors).
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Constitution in these situations.173 This situation is inapposite,
not only because a state may not condition the receipt of a benefit
on the relinquishment of a constitutional right,174 but also
because the funding cases involve areas, like abortion, in which
the state not only has a legitimate interest in declining to fund
certain activities but also in the activities underlying the
funding.175 This is, by definition, not true in the religion
situation, because under the First Amendment, government does
not have an interest in religion at all.176 More specifically, the
state has no legitimate interest in preventing Davey from
becoming a minister because such a choice would, without
question, be protected by his Free Exercise right;177 it only has
173 See United States v. Am. Library Ass'n, 539 U.S. 194, 212 (2003) (stating
"legislature's decision not to subsidize the exercise of a fundamental right does not
infringe the right"); see also Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 193 (1991) (holding "[t]he
Government can... selectively fund a program to encourage certain activities it believes to
be in the public interest, without at the same time funding an alternative program which
seeks to deal with the problem in another way"); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 317
(1980) (highlighting that "[governmental] refusal to fund [a] protected activity, without
more, cannot be equated with the imposition of a penalty on that activity").
174 See Regan v. Taxation with Representation, 461 U.S. 540, 545 (1983) (stating
Supreme Court has "held that the government may not deny a benefit to a person because
he exercises a constitutional right"); see also McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 626 (1978)
(noting "to condition the availability of benefits... upon [the] appellant's willingness to
violate a cardinal principle of his religious faith by surrendering his religiously impelled
ministry effectively penalizes the free exercise of his constitutional liberties"); Cf. Bd. of
County Comm'rs v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668, 674 (1996) (finding "the modern
'unconstitutional conditions' doctrine holds that the government may not deny a benefit to
a person on a basis that infringes his constitutionally protected freedom of speech even if
he has no entitlement to that benefit").
175 Compare Rust, 500 U.S. at 194 (stating government can decide "to fund a program
dedicated to advance certain permissible goals") with Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505
U.S. 833, 846 (1993) (holding "the State has legitimate interests from the outset of the
pregnancy in protecting. . .the life of the fetus that may become a child"). See generally
Benton v. Rhodes, 586 F.2d 1, 3 (6th Cir. 1978) (noting states' decision to fund or decline
funding to one program is a matter of state policy).
176 See David W. Burcham, School Desegregation and the First Amendment, 59 ALB.
L. REV. 213, 239 (1995) (stating "the Court has identified the underlying constitutional
value.. .toward religion.. .and require[s] that government may neither advance one
religion over another, nor all religions over no religion"); see also Devon M. Lehman, The
Godless Graduation Ceremony?: The State of Student-Initiated Prayer after Lee v.
Weisman and Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 72 U. COLO. L. REV. 175, 189 (2001)
(stating "[t]he Supreme Court and the First Amendment require ...that the government
remain neutral toward religion"); cf. Walz v. Tax Comm'n of N.Y., 397 U.S. 664, 702
(1970) (finding "[t]he general principle deducible from the First Amendment and all that
has been said by the Court is this: that we will not tolerate either governmentally
established religion or governmental interference with religion").
177 See Witters v. Washington, 474 U.S. 481, 489 (1986) (holding that extension of aid
under state vocational rehabilitation program to finance petitioner's training at one
Christian college to become a pastor, missionary, or youth director would not advance
religion in a manner inconsistent with First Amendment Establishment Clause); see also
McDaniel, 435 U.S. at 626 (stating that "the right to the free exercise of religion
unquestionably encompasses the right to preach,. proselyte, and perform other similar
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an interest in preventing state funds from going to religious
education. If this interest is not pursued in a manner that is
neutral toward religion, then the state will violate the
Constitution. 178
D. Impact of Locke v. Davey on School Vouchers
Now that the Supreme Court has ruled that school voucher
programs that include religious schools do not violate the
Establishment Clause,179 the next big question will be whether
school voucher programs can exclude religious schools without
violating the Free Exercise Clause.180 The First Circuit has
already held that such a law would not violate the Free Exercise
Clause,'18 but this case was decided on federal Establishment
religious functions, or, in other words, to be a minister"); cf. Mark Edward DeForrest, An
Overview and Evaluation of State Blaine Amendments: Origins, Scope, and First
Amendment Concerns, 26 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 551, 615 (2003) (noting that, in light of
Court decisions in Witters and McDaniel, religious profiling is constitutionally prohibited).
178 See Everson v. Bd. of Ed., 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947) (holding that First Amendment
"requires the state to be a neutral in its relations with groups of religious believers and
non-believers"); see also Gall, supra note 140, at 425 (highlighting "the First Amendment
dictates that religion be treated neutrally, rather than in a discriminatory fashion"); cf.
Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 651 (2002) (stating "government programs that
neutrally provide benefits to a broad class of citizens defined without reference to religion
are not readily subject to an Establishment Clause challenge").
179 See Zelman, 536 U.S. at 662 (holding Ohio voucher program which permitted
individuals to attend either religious or nonreligious institutions did not violate
Establishment Clause); see also Bonnie Daboll, Note, School Choice Legislation:
Constitutional Limitations on State Regulation of Participating Parochial Schools After
Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 55 FLA. L. REV. 711, 724 (2003) (noting Court, in Zelman,
"unequivocally held that school voucher programs... do not violate the establishment
clause"); Elisha Winkler, Simmons Harris v. Zelman, 10 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POLY & L.
757, 767 (2002) (finding that Court, in Zelman, may have found Ohio program to be
neutral because aid directed to religious institution under program solely results from
parent(s)' private choice).
180 See Edelstein, supra note 20, at153 (questioning if post-Zelman states will be
required to include religious schools in aid programs); see also Robert A. Dietzel,
Comment, The Future of School Vouchers: A Reflection on Zelman v. Simmons-Harris and
an Examination of the Blaine Amendments as a Viable Challenge to Sectarian School Aid
Programs, 2003 MICH. ST. DCL L. REV. 791, 794-95 (2003) (arguing after Zelman,
"questions remain as to whether challenges to voucher programs based on the Blaine
Amendments will be successful.., because of their history of religious bigotry and
because they allow states to purposefully exclude religious schools from plans altogether,
[they] may violate the Free Exercise clause"); Colleen Carlton Smith, Note, Zelman's
Evolving Legacy: Selective Funding of Secular Private Schools in State School Choice
Programs, 89 VA. L. REV. 1953, 1954 (2003) (noting "[o]f the many unanswered questions
remaining after Zelman, one immediately has emerged as the paramount legal issue in
the area of school choice programs: whether states may administer school choice programs
that permit participation by public and private secular schools but exclude religious
educational programs").
181 See Strout v. Albanese, 178 F.3d 57, 65 (1st Cir. 1999) (quoting Hernandez v.
Comm'r, 490 U.S. 680, 699 (1989)) (concluding that Maine tuition program which excludes
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grounds182 before the Supreme Court's decision in Zelman. It is
not completely certain how the Locke decision will impact school
vouchers, but it is likely that the Court will use similar logic to
uphold laws that exclude religious schools from voucher
programs.
Some have argued that Locke may be limited in its
applicability to voucher programs; instead, they argue that the
Court took pains to limit Locke to its particular facts. 183 First of
all, the Court noted the history since the United States' founding
of looking upon benefits to clergy members with disfavor,184 an
interest that would not be implicated in school voucher cases.
Secondly, the Court went to great lengths to point out how the
Promise Scholarship program actually accommodated students
religious schools does not violate Free Exercise Clause; applying Free Exercise analysis
that requires protection only of "central belief or practice"). Cf. Hernandez v. Comm'r, 490
U.S. 680, 699 (1989) (holding that "[iut is not within the judicial ken to question the
centrality of particular beliefs or practices to a faith") with Strout, 178 F.3d at 65
(observing that "education at parochial school is not [a central belief or practice of
Catholicism], for the Roman Catholic Church does not mandate it"). See generally Smith,
supra note 180, at 1961 (highlighting that First Circuit's opinion in Strout v. Albanese
found no Free Exercise Clause violations).
182 See Strout, 178 F.3d at 64 (asserting "state's compelling interest in avoiding an
Establishment Clause violation requires that the statute exclude sectarian schools from
the tuition program"); see also Wanda I. Otero-Ziegler, Note, The Remains of the Wall:
From Everson v. Board of Education to Strout v. Albanese and Beyond, 10 TEMP. POL. &
Civ. RTs. L. REV. 207, 207 (2000) (arguing "[a]lthough the Strout court considered the
constitutionality of [the statute] under various constitutional provisions, the central
challenge posed in Strout relates to the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.");
Smith, supra note 180, at 1961 (explaining that if a religious school program was
validated by the Court, "the First Circuit indicated that 'plaintiffs might... seek relief on
free exercise or equal protection grounds, for... the legislative basis for the exclusion of
sectarian schools - the fear that the establishment clause bars their inclusion - will have
been negated"').
183 See Mauro, State Aid, supra note 87, at 3 (noting "other critics of the ruling
interpreted the decision as a narrow one limited to divinity training at the college level,
with little impact on the voucher issue."); Walter M. Weber, Locke v. Davey: What It Says,
and What It Doesn't Say, available at http://www.aclj.org/ussc/daveylocke/webersays
_doesnt.say.pdf, at 2-3 (expressing Locke does not stand for states excluding religious
schools from voucher programs); see also What's Next for Vouchers? Recent Ruling Likely
to Slow Supporters, YOUR SCHOOL AND THE LAw, March 24, 2004 (finding that "voucher
supporters are downplaying the U.S. Supreme Court's recent ruling in Locke... as being
narrow and having more to do with higher education").
184 See Locke v. Davey, 124 S. Ct. 1307, 1313 (2004) (observing "[s]ince the founding
of our country, there have been popular uprisings against procuring taxpayer funds to
support church leaders"); Recent Development in the Law: Recent Decisions: Supreme
Court, 33 J.L. & EDUC. 383, 383-84 (2004) (explaining "prohibitions against using tax
payer's funds to support the ministry has been a hallmark of constitutional jurisprudence.
Therefore the State's interest in denying the funding of devotional theology degrees is a
compelling state interest and thus the scholarship program does not violate the student's
First Amendment rights."). But see McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 622-25 (1978)
(plurality opinion) (recognizing history of disqualification of ministers from holding state
office, but ultimately rejecting validity of state interest based on that history).
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who choose to go to religious schools.185 Lastly, the Court noted
that the state constitutional provision before them was not one of
the so-called Blaine Amendments 186 and those provisions with
the anti-Catholic history were not before the Court.18 7 These
Blaine Amendments would probably be the provisions that states
would rely upon; however, should they choose to exclude religious
schools from eligibility in voucher programs,188 the Court at least
suggests it might come out differently if such provisions were
under consideration. 189  However, assuming the Court's
composition stays the same, and recognizing that at least one of
185 See Locke, 540 U.S. 124 S. Ct. at 1314-15 (noting that program allows students to
attend 'pervasively religious schools' and to take classes in devotional theology); Montoya,
supra note 91, at 1165 (arguing "the Court did not consider the Promise Scholarship
hostile towards religion. Rather, the scholarship 'goes a long way toward including
religion in its benefits.' The only limitation is that students may not both major in
devotional theology and receive a Promise Scholarship"); Recent Development, supra note
184, at 383-84 (explaining Court's observation that "on a close look at the history of the
scholarship program and the laws surrounding it, there was no evidence of animus
towards religion in the scholarship program. Students are able to use the scholarships at
accredited religious schools and are still eligible to take devotional theology classes").
186 See Locke, 124 S. Ct. at 1314, n.7 (stating provision in question is not such a
Blaine Amendment); see also Montoya, supra note 91, at 1171-72 (stating "Chief Justice
Rehnquist denied that the provision in Washington's constitution is a Blaine
Amendment, and neither Justices Scalia nor Thomas brought up the subject of Blaine
Amendments"); Duncan, supra note 116, at 508-14 (noting how original Blaine
Amendment was proposed as addition to Federal Constitution and when it was rejected,
several states adopted various versions of it for their own constitutions).
187 See Locke, 124 S. Ct. at 1314, n.7 (noting that "the Blaine Amendment's history is
simply not before us"); see also Duncan, supra note 116, at 508-14 (discussing how this
Blaine Amendment and its progeny were born of anti-Catholic sentiment toward the end
of nineteenth century); Montoya, supra note 91, at 1171-72 (discussing Blaine
amendment).
188 See DeForrest, supra note 177, at 554 (highlighting "importance of state law in
evaluating the overall legality of vouchers"); see also Dietzel, supra note 180, at 794
(arguing that state Blaine Amendments remain post-Zelman as potential challenges to
state voucher programs that include parochial schools); George S. Swan, The Law and
Economics of the Blaine Amendments: Zelman v. Simmons-Harris and Romer v. Evans, 80
U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 301, 302 (2003) (noting, despite decision in Zelman, that state
Blaine Amendments remain as barriers to voucher availability at religious schools).
189 See Locke v. Davey, 124 S. Ct. 1307, 1314 (2004) (discussing "hostility toward
religion;" (suggesting, while not directly holding, that animosity toward religion was one
important factor in their decision and that state laws evincing such animosity might
change such situation); Montoya, supra note 91, at 1164 (concluding after reviewing Free
Exercise Clause precedent on which Davey relied, that this Promise Scholarship involved
different factual circumstances and 'far milder' state disfavor of religion than Supreme
Court had invalidated in prior cases); Recent Development, supra note 184, at 383
(typifying, by example, one city ordinance in prior case criminalized engaging in certain
kinds of animal slaughter, causing suppression of ritualistic animal sacrifices
characteristic of one particular religion, while in contrast, no criminal or civil sanctions
are imposed on any type of religious practice in Locke; and there the state does not deny
ministers their rights to participate in community political affairs, nor does it require
students to choose between their religious beliefs and receiving government benefits; this
implies that if animosity toward religion were present in Locke, the Court would probably
have decided otherwise).
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the justices in the Zelman majority expressed concern about the
impact of a decision in Davey's favor on school voucher plans
already in place in several states that do exclude religious
schools,190 it is unlikely that the Court would reverse the trend it
started in Locke in school vouchers cases.191
V. CONCLUSION
Locke v. Davey presented the Supreme Court with the
opportunity to put the final peg in place with respect to a unified
approach to the two First Amendment Religion Clauses. The
Court should have held that neutrality in scholarship
disbursement in this case was not only permissible under the
Establishment Clause, but required under the Free Exercise
Clause. This would have joined the two clauses together the way
they were intended to be in. the protection of individual religious
belief and choices and in requiring states not to discriminate on
the basis of religion. The Court declined the opportunity to do so,
by holding that the state of Washington could directly exclude
theology majors from obtaining a scholarship available to those
who are majoring in any other course of study.192 In doing so, the
190 See Rob Boston, Supreme Victory: High Court Thwarts Religious Right Scheme to
Require State Funding for Religion, CHURCH & STATE, Apr. 1, 2004, at 4 (describing
Justice O'Connor's reaction to admission that ruling in Davey's favor would require
government to offer vouchers for private religious schools: 'That clearly did not sit well
with the justice. A stern-looking O'Connor admonished Sekulow, 'What you're proposing
here would have a major impact on voucher programs."'); see also Mauro, supra note 146,
at 10 (noting that Justice O'Connor "seemed worried that a ruling in Davey's favor would
make it mandatory - not optional - for states to include parochial schools in voucher
programs"); see also Luiza Ch. Savage, Supreme Court Rules that States Need Not
Subsidize Religious Studies, N.Y. SUN, Feb. 26, 2004, at 7 (commenting, "A frequent
swing-voter, Justice O'Connor, expressed concern during oral argument that such an
equality rule could impose high costs on states that would find themselves forced to fund
additional groups and activities").
191 See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 687-717 (2002) (Souter, J.,
dissenting) (typifying how, presumably, Zelman's four dissenters would not vote that
voucher programs must include religious schools after viewing programs that did include
religious programs as unconstitutional); see also Strout v. Albanese, 178 F.3d 57, 64 n.12
(1st Cir. 1999) (indicating that, under different Establishment Clause understanding from
the one this Circuit articulated, states might be required to fund religious programs as
well; furthermore, proposing that state interest would not withstand scrutiny if based on
false understanding of Establishment Clause); Eulitt v. Me. Dep't of Educ., No. CV-02-
162-B-W, 2004 WL 423981, at *2 (D.Me. March 9, 2004) (refusing to reverse First Circuit
holding in Strout based on new Supreme Court precedent in Zelman and Locke; as this
was prior to Locke as well as Zelman, it is unclear whether they would come out
differently on this question today).
192 See Locke, 124 S. Ct. at 1309 (stating "[iln accordance with the State Constitution,
students may not use the scholarship at an institution where they are pursuing a degree
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Court has not only signaled a departure from reading the
Religion Clauses together, but also from its Free Exercise
precedent standing alone, by no longer requiring neutrality from
a law before affording it deferential treatment. This sets a
dangerous precedent in the Court's jurisprudence on that part of
the First Amendment that is supposed to protect religious liberty
by allowing non-neutral laws to avoid strict scrutiny analysis.
Though the impact of this case may not be great, that is
immaterial when Constitutional principles are at stake. This is
one step closer to the death of neutrality as a principle governing
the First Amendment Religion Clauses; the first step is always
the hardest, and now in Davey it has already been made.
in devotional theology. We hold that such an exclusion from an otherwise inclusive aid
program does not violate the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment."); see also
Beth Hanson, From Cheney to Guantanamo: Notable Decisions; Supreme Court Review:
Highlights of the Term, LEGAL TIMES, July 5, 2004, at 10 (noting this "holding affirmed
that under the establishment clause of the First Amendment, the state of Washington
could deny Joshua Davey access to state scholarship funds because Davey chose to major
in pastoral ministries at Northwest College near Seattle"); Bernard James, What 'Locke'
Portends, NAT'L L. J., Aug. 2, 2004, at S10 (discussing how "court ruled, 7-2, that the state
of Washington did not violate the First Amendment's protection of free exercise of religion
by refusing to provide otherwise applicable scholarships to Joshua Davey, solely because
he was pursuing a devotional theology degree").
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